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WORKPLACE SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN SINGAPORE:
THE LEGAL CHALLENGE
This article examines the nature and prevalence of sexual harassment in
the work environment, and compares civil and criminal law in Singapore
to the approaches taken by various jurisdictions in dealing with the
problem. It is submitted that legislation is needed to protect employees,
as Singapore law currently does not present any clear and coherent means
for victims to seek redress for workplace sexual harassment.
I. INTRODUCTION
MADDIE Mokhtar Ahmad joined the human resource department of a
well-established communications company in Malaysia. It was a dream
come true — she had always wanted to work there. She enjoyed her new
work environment and made new friends. Then her world changed. A
male colleague who was her superior began harassing her by making lewd
remarks to her.1 Work became a nightmare for Maddie. She was afraid
that her harasser’s statements would escalate into actions. Under great
strain, she saw a doctor who prescribed pills to relieve her stress and
fatigue and to help her sleep. She became addicted to them. Eventually,
she complained about the harassment to her company’s human resource
department and requested a transfer. However, the harasser learned about
the complaint and recommended that she be discharged. The human
resource manager and his deputy wanted to help her, but were afraid of
repercussions. Finally, Maddie quit her job.2
Maddie’s harasser subjected her to only verbal abuse. Jeffrey Yung Siew
Leong, a 28-year-old Singaporean salesman, went further. In February
1995, Yung began harassing a colleague by showing her pornographic
magazines and asking her to touch his private parts. On 4 May, he asked
her whether she had big breasts and molested her. She warned him not
to carry on but he persisted, exposing himself to her and asking her to
touch him. The next day, he molested her a second time. These acts took
place in the showroom of the graphics company where they worked. The
victim reported Yung to the police. He was jailed six months and given
three strokes of the cane for outraging the victim’s modesty, and one
month’s jail for exposing himself and making lewd suggestions.3
l
2
3
She was constantly subjected to statements like: “I think you are not a virgin.”, “Do
you easily get wet?”, “If I had the chance to screw you, I’d screw you up and down,
high and Jow, back and front.”, “Your butt is too big for your breasts, they just don’t
match.”, “Your breasts are too small for me. I like women with big boobs.”, “Don’t
stand in front of me, or mine will be standing!” and “Want to watch blue films with
me? I can lend you some of my blue tapes.”
Maddie Mokhtar Ahmad, “My Nightmare in the Office”, New Straits Times, 10 May
1997 at 10.
“Salesman Exposed for Office Harassment”, The Straits Times, 6 January 1996 at 30.
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=648404
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Work is important to most of us. Apart from enabling us to earn a living
and to achieve prominence through career development, those of us who
enjoy our work find that it builds self-esteem and brings a sense of
fulfilment. Yet, for women like Maddie Mokhtar Ahmad, work is a
nightmare because of the verbal and physical abuse they receive from
those they work with. This article begins with an examination of the nature
and prevalence of sexual harassment in the work environment. It goes
on to look at the approaches taken by various jurisdictions in dealing
with the problem, and finally considers the present legal position in
Singapore and the way ahead.
A. What is Sexual Harassment?
Laws against sexual harassment can only be effective if they can accurately
identify the behaviour to be proscribed.
According to Louise Fitzgerald and Alayne Omerod,4 sexual harassment
(1) involves the sexualization of a professional relationship; (2) frequently
occurs in the context of an organizational power differential (eg
supervisor-employee), although it can occur in the absence of one (eg
hostile work environment); (3) consists of unwanted and unwelcome
behaviour, both verbal and non-verbal in nature; and (4) can be viewed
along a continuum, from sexist remarks to non-verbal seductive gestures
to sexual assault. Data collected by researchers in the fields of human-
resource management and psychology gives us an idea of the range of
harassing behaviour experienced by respondents. For instance, Frank Till5
classified the responses to an open-ended sexual harassment survey of
college women and derived the following categories of sexual harassment,
arranged in order of generally increasing severity:
i.
ii.
iii.
Gender harassment — generalised sexist remarks and
behaviour not designed to elicit sexual co-operation but rather
to convey insulting, degrading or sexist attitudes about women;
Seductive behaviour — unwanted, inappropriate and offensive
sexual advances;
Sexual bribery — the solicitation of sexual activity or other
sex-linked behaviour by the promise of a reward, such as a
salary increase or promotion;
4
5
Louise F Fitzgerald & Alayne Omerod, “Sexual Harassment in Academia and the
Workplace” in Psychology of Women: A Handbook of Issues and Theories (F Demark
& M Paludi eds, 1993) at 556, cited Anne Levy & Michele Pahidi, Workplace Sexual
Harassment (1996) at 48.
Frank Till, Sexual Harassment: A Report on the Sexual Harassment of Students (1980),
cited in Levy & Paludi, ibid at 47.
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iv.
v.
Sexual coercion — the solicitation of sexual activity by threat
of punishment, for instance a failure to give a promotion or
being fired; and
Sexual imposition or assault — this would include gross sexual
imposition, assault and rape.
We can draw the following conclusions about sexual harassment:
i.
ii.
ii.
Sexual harassment occurs when one person abuses power
which he possesses to intimidate, coerce or humiliate someone
else because of his or her sex. When it occurs in the workplace,
it introduces an inappropriate sexual element into what should
be a professional relationship.
The hallmark of sexual harassment is that it is unwelcome.
There can be no sexual harassment when two people
voluntarily establish a personal, intimate relationship with each
other.
Sexual harassment can take many forms, both verbal and
physical. Examples of verbal harassment include sexual
innuendos, comments and remarks; suggestive, obscene or
insulting sounds; implied or overt threats; and pressure for
sex. Physical harassment includes leering or ogling; displaying
offensive pictures; making obscene gestures; patting, pinching
or brushing up against the victim’s body; assault; and coerced
sexual intercourse. It can occur only once, or can be repeated.6
Sexual harassment has been legally defined in several jurisdictions which
have enacted laws to address the problem. In the United States of
America, there exist both federal and state statutes prohibiting sexual
harassment. The federal statute is known as Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act 1964, about which more will be said later. In 1980, the US Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), established under that
statute, issued guidelines defining workplace sexual harassment as follows:
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other
verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual
harassment when (1) submission to such conduct is made either
explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individual’s
employment, (2) submission to or rejection of such conduct by an
individual is used as a basis for employment decisions affecting such
individual, or (3) such conduct has the purpose or effect of
unreasonably interfering with an individual’s work performance or
creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment.7
6
7
Levy & Paludi, ibid.
29 CFR § 1604.1 l(a). The EEOC recently proposed adding the words “or otherwise
adversely affects an individual’s employment opportunities” to part (3) of the above
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The EEOC definition recognises two forms of sexual harassment in the
workplace: quid pro quo harassment, and hostile environment harassment.
The US Supreme Court has agreed with the Commission that both of
these are violations of federal law. Quid pro quo harassment occurs when
a manager or someone with authority to confer job benefits offers those
benefits to an employee in exchange for sexual favours or threatens to
take away certain benefits if the employee does not comply with his
demands.8
Sexual harassment may occur even when there is no suggestion that a
harasser is abusing his power over the victim. The victim may instead
find that it is difficult for her as a woman to succeed in her working
environment because of some behaviour, conduct, work rule, or a
combination of these. This is the basis of hostile work environment
harassment, which is why it has been suggested that a more accurate
term would be discriminatory work environment harassment.9 In Henson
v City of Dundee,10 the Court held that:
Sexual harassment which causes a hostile or offensive environment
for members of one sex is every bit the arbitrary barrier to sexual
equality at the workplace that racial harassment is to racial equality.
Surely, a requirement that a man or woman run a gauntlet of sexual
abuse in return for the privilege of being allowed to work and make
a living can be as demeaning and disconcerting as the harshest of
racial epithets.
In the landmark case of Meritor Savings Bank v Vinson,11 a bank
supervisor forced intercourse on the plaintiff, as well as exposed himself
to her and other employees. Though the supervisor had not explicitly or
implicitly made an offer of workplace benefits to or threatened to
withdraw such benefits from the plaintiff, the US Supreme Court found
that she had been sexually harassed. It agreed with the EEOC that certain
conduct directed towards women, whether or not it is directly linked to
the grant or denial of an economic benefit, could constitute a violation
of Title VII if the conduct “has the purpose or effect of unreasonably
interfering with an individual’s work performance or creating an
definition to make it clear that conduct does not necessarily have to interfere with a
person’s work performance in order to violate Title VII. However, due to a controversy
which erupted about a part of the guidelines interpreting religious harassment, the
EEOC withdrew the guidelines, intending to reissue them at a later date. But the
proposed wording reflects current interpretations and continues to be the law in the
USA: Levy & Paludi, ibid at 14–15.
Williams v Saxbe (1976) 413 F Supp 654 (DC Cir); Barnes v Costle (1977) 561 F 2d
983 (DC Cir).
Levy & Paludi, supra n 4, at 20.
(1982) 682 F 2d 897 at 902 (11th Cir).
(1986) 477 US 57 (SC, USA).
8
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intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment.” The behaviour need
not be overtly abusive. In Ellison v Brady,12 an employee of the Internal
Revenue Service was held to have been sexually harassed by being
subjected to continuing unwanted “romantic” overtures in the form of
letters and pestering questions from a co-worker, even though there were
no instances of threats or physical contact.
The law on hostile or discriminatory work environment harassment is a
growing area in the United States, and its boundaries have yet to be
clearly outlined. For instance, a claim of sexual harassment has been
upheld where women lobby attendants were ordered by their employer
to wear suggestive uniforms, which led to whistling and rude comments
by customers. The court decided that the dress code had demeaned the
women employees and their roles as professional workers, and thus
created a hostile work environment. It has also been suggested that
sexually suggestive e-mail or pornographic software on company
computers may create a discriminatory work environment.13
Laws in other jurisdictions also recognise the two aspects of sexual
harassment identified in the United States. For instance, the Canadian
Labour Code14 defines sexual harassment as “any conduct, comment,
gesture or contact of a sexual nature (a) that is likely to cause offence or
humiliation to any employee; or (b) that might, on reasonable grounds,
be perceived by that employee as placing a condition of a sexual nature
or employment on any opportunity for training or promotion.” The
Australian Commonwealth Sex Discrimination Act 198415 considers a
person to be sexually harassed by another person if (a) that person makes
“an unwelcome sexual advance, or an unwelcome request for sexual
favours, to the person harassed” or (b) “engages in other unwelcome
conduct of a sexual nature in relation to the person harassed” in
circumstances in which a reasonable person, having regard to all the
circumstances would have anticipated that the person harassed would be
12
13
(1991) 924 F 2d 892 (9th Cir).
Levy & Paludi, supra n 4, at 32–33. In Stewart v Cleveland Guest (Engineering) Ltd
[1994] IRLR 440, the UK Employment Appeal Tribunal held that it may be an act of
sexual discrimination within the meaning of section 1(1)(a) of the UK Sex
Discrimination Act 1975 for an employer to allow male employees to display in the
workplace pictures of nude and partially-nude women, and that it is crucial that
complaints about such matters are not treated as trivial but are taken up, investigated
and dealt with in a sympathetic and sensible fashion. On the facts, though, the Tribunal
found that the appellant had not been discriminated against as she had not shown that
her employers had treated her less favourably than they would have treated a man.
Section 247.1, RSC 1985 (1st Supp) c 9.
Section 28A(1) of the Cth Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (No 4, 1984) as amended by
the Cth Sex Discrimination and Other Legislation Amendment Act 1992 (No 179,
1992). See also s 58, ACT Discrimination Act 1991 (No 81, 1991), 31 January 1997
reprint; s 22(2), NT Anti-Discrimination Act 1994; s 87(11), s 87(11), SA Equal
Opportunity Act 1984 (No 95, 1984); s 85, Vic Equal Opportunity Act 1985 (No 42/
1995); s 24(3), WA Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (No 83, 1984).
14
15
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offended, humiliated or intimidated. The statute then goes on to prohibit
sexual harassment in a variety of situations, including employment,
education and the provision of goods and services.
B. The Nature and Incidence of Workplace Sexual Harassment
1. How Often Does Workplace Sexual Harassment Occur?
The short answer is: more often than we think. In 1980, the United States
Merit Systems Protection Board conducted a survey among 23,000 male
and female US federal government employees. They found that 42% of
women and 15% of men were victims of incidents of overt sexual
harassment over a two-year period. The incidents ranged from sexual
teasing, jokes, remarks and questions to actual or attempted assault or
rape.16 An identical result was reached in a second study by the Board
covering the years 1985 to 1987 — again, 42% of women working for the
federal government said that they had been sexually harassed during the
2-year period.17 Subsequently, a 1989 survey conducted by the National
Law Journal/West Publishing Company of 918 women lawyers in 250 top
law firms in the United States revealed that 60% of them had experienced
some form of sexual harassment, such as unwanted sexual teasing, jokes,
remarks or questions, unwanted sexual looks or gestures, unwanted
deliberate touching, leaning over, cornering or pinching, as well as
pressure for sex.18
In Canada, a 1983 survey by the Canadian Human Rights Commission
of 2,004 men and women found that 45% of women and 33% of men
had experienced unwanted sexual attention.19 Similar results were reported
in the United Kingdom not too long ago. According to a survey by the
Alfred Marks Bureau in 1991,20 47% of women and 14% men had
experienced sexual harassment in the workplace, while the Industrial
Society’s study conducted in 199321 showed that just over half of working
women had been sexually harassed. Closer to home, a 1990 poll by the
Labour Ministry of Japan reported that 43% of women managers reported
experiencing some form of sexual harassment.22
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
Arjun P Aggarwal, Sexual Harassment: A Guide for Understanding and Prevention
(1992) at 2–3, 8; Kerry Seagrave, The Sexual Harassment of Women in the Workplace,
1600 to 1993 (1994) at 200–01.
Seagrave, at 202.
Aggarwal, supra n 16; Seagrave, at 204.
Ibid.
Alfred Marks Bureau, Sexual Harassment in the Office: A Quantitative Report on Client
Attitudes and Experience (1991), cited in Rohan Collier, Combating Sexual Harassment
in the Workplace (1995) at 9.
Industrial Society, No Offence? Sexual Harassment, How it Happens and How to Beat
It (1993), cited in Collier, ibid.
Seagrave, supra n 16 at 213.
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2. Who Get Harassed, and Who are the Harassers?
It is evident from the previous section that both women and men
experience sexual harassment. However, it is women who form the
majority, especially those who hold junior positions or are in serving or
caring jobs, such as administrative staff, factory workers, nurses,
receptionists, sales assistants, secretaries, social workers and teachers. The
1991 Alfred Marks Bureau survey found that 62% of sexual harassment
victims are women while, according to the Industrial Society, less than
7% of working men get harassed.23 The author may therefore be excused
for referring in this article to harassers using male pronouns and those
harassed using female pronouns.
Homosexuals experience more sexual harassment than heterosexuals. It
has been found that one in two gay men and women have been harassed
at work, 48% of these specifically because of their sexuality. Of these,
79% experienced jokes or teasing, 51% homophobic abuse, 41%
aggressive questioning, 14% threats and 5% physical violence.24
As for harassers, studies show that they are generally men of similar or
higher status than the persons harassed, whether male or female. A 1988
survey by Fortune magazine of 160 of the top 500 companies in the United
States showed that 36% of complaints of sexual harassment were against
the woman’s immediate supervisor, 26% against some other person of
superior status, and 38% against co-workers of equal status.25 These results
are comparable to the Alfred Marks survey in the United Kingdom
referred to above, which revealed that 43% of respondents had
experienced harassment by their immediate bosses, 59% by senior staff
other than their immediate bosses, and 55% by their colleagues.26
3. What are the Effects of Sexual Harassment?
Sexual harassment has a devastating effect on the victim’s ability to work
effectively or maintain personal relationships outside work. The Industrial
Society’s survey revealed that sexual harassment is one of the most
upsetting, humiliating and destructive experiences to an employee. Of
the employees in the survey who reported being sexually harassed, 37%
said that it interfered with their thinking and judgment, 24% that it made
them less co-operative and productive, 18% that it made it difficult for
them to concentrate, 8% that it led to behavioural changes and more
frequent accidents, and 5% that they were more prone to absences or
23
24
25
26
Ibid
Stonewall, Less Equal Than Others: A Survey of Lesbians and Gay Men at Work
(1993), cited in Collier, ibid.
Seagrave, supra n 16 at 203.
Alfred Marks Bureau, cited in Collier, supra n 20 at 11.
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lateness. Bodily symptoms reported by sexual harassment victims include
loss of concentration, headaches, nausea, insomnia, anorexia, mood swings,
panic attacks, loss of libido and depression.27
The physical effects of sexual harassment on employees naturally have
an impact on their employers’ businesses. A survey conducted by the US
government in 1988 showed that about 36,000 US federal government
employees had quit their jobs because of sexual harassment on the job
between 1985 and 1987; this was estimated to have cost the federal
government US$267 million in turnover, sick leave and lost productivity.28
A 1994 survey of Fortune 500 companies by USA Today found that sexual
harassment costs employers US$6.7 million (about S$10.1 million) a year
because of increased absenteeism, employee turnover, low morale and
poor productivity.29
4. The Singapore Experience
No wide-scale survey of the prevalence of sexual harassment has been
conducted in Singapore. However, in an effort to determine its extent
here, between June and July 1993 the Association of Women for Action
and Research (AWARE) sent out questionnaires to 1,600 women working
for 56 selected Japanese companies.30 Rather disappointingly, only 389
responses were received. However, almost half of the respondents (49.6%)
reported experiencing sexual harassment.
Of these women, 47.3% were visually or verbally harassed, while 27.8%
were physically harassed. The most common forms of non-physical
harassment were ogling, being called insulting nicknames (such as “sexy”
and “honey”), persistent unwelcome questioning (“Are you free tonight?”)
and being asked embarrassing personal questions about their bodies (the
size of their breasts, for instance). Those who were physical harassed
were most likely to have had harassers stand very close to them or actually
squeeze up against them, or to have their hands grabbed, or breasts or
buttocks touched. Almost half of the respondents had experienced both
physical and non-physical harassment.
27
28
29
30
Collier, supra n 20 at 11, 25–26.
Aggarwal, supra n 19.
“Office Problem Can Also Affect Business Profitability, Says Study”, Business Times,
4 August 1994 at 12.
AWARE, The Aware Report on Sexual Harassment (unpublished, 24 March 1994).
Some of the findings in the AWARE survey were reported in Schutz Lee, “Half of
Women in Survey Cite Sexual Harassment at Work”, The Business Times, 25 March
1994 at 2. Since their 1993 survey, AWARE has found that almost 12% of the telephone
calls to their telephone helpline involve complaints of sexual harassment at work. In
1996, 29 out of 249 callers (11.6%) complained about workplace sexual harassment,
while in 1997 the figures were 13 out of 110 callers (11.8%). The total number of calls
includes some instances of repeat callers. The writer would like to thank Mrs Hedwig
Anuar of AWARE for allowing him access to the AWARE report as well as to the
telephone helpline figures.
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The study also found that an overwhelming number of the women
harassed were under the age of 35 (85.5%), most being between 20 and
29 (73.6%). In contrast, their harassers were largely in their 30s and 40s
(33.9% and 32.2% respectively), and had repeated their unwanted
behaviour a few times (42.4%). Most of the women were in administrative
(30.2%), executive (24.5%) or clerical (24.5%) occupations. 56.7% of the
women had been sexually harassed by their superiors, while 39.1% had
been harassed by colleagues.
The most common responses to sexual harassment were to avoid the
harassers (28.0%), brush off the harassment with jokes (18.3%), tell the
harassers clearly that the behaviour was undesired (14.9%), and to consult
relatives and friends (14.3%) or other people working in the company,
such as a boss, personnel officer or colleague (11.4%). A majority of
those women who confronted their harassers found that the behaviour
stopped (53.7%). However, a significant proportion (27.8%) still received
harassment after that. Of those who took no action, 25.4% felt that
reporting the harassment would invite more difficulties at work, while
21.1% were too embarrassed to tell anyone and/or did not know what to
do. 15.5% felt that no one would believe them.
In January 1995, the assistant secretary-general of the National Trades
Union Congress, Ms Yu-Foo Yee Shoon, remarked in a speech that many
women unionists do not feel that sexual harassment is a major or burning
issue affecting them. “The reason for this could be that our society still
retains some of the basic values and norms concerning morality. This
could act as a restraint against abusive behaviour at the workplace... Of
greater concern to the women is how to balance career and families.”31
Her comments appear to contradict the findings of the AWARE survey.
Although the significance of the survey is naturally limited by the small
number of responses received, as the AWARE report points out, the
findings so far are “sufficiently alarming to justify further investigation
and research into the extent of the problem in other firms — foreign or
local — in Singapore.”
II. THE STATE OF THE LAW IN SINGAPORE
To date, no specific legislation addressing the issue of sexual harassment
has been enacted in Singapore. As a result, employees who are sexually
harassed and wish to obtain legal redress through the civil courts must
seek their remedies in the common law.
In this Part of the article, we first consider the Singapore Constitution
and its impact on the issue of sexual harassment. We then look at possible
31 “Sexual Harassment ‘Not Key Issue for Women’”, The Straits Times, 19 January 1995
at 24.
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causes of action in tort and contract that may be available to employees.
Most of them pin liability on the harasser himself. Such a person could
be the victim’s co-employee, whether her superior, colleague or
subordinate. The harasser could also be the victim’s employer, such as a
sole proprietor of a business or a member of a partnership — here, the
additional issue of whether there has been a breach of the victim’s
employment contract would arise. Where the victim is employed by a
corporation, the latter may be primarily liable for breaching her
employment contract. The employer may also be primarily liable for
breaching his duty of care towards his employee, or vicariously liable for
a tort committed by one of his other employees.
In addition, acts of sexual harassment may also constitute criminal offences
which the State has an interest in prosecuting. The primary purposes of
criminal law are to punish offenders and deter them from repeating their
crimes, as well as to send a warning to others who might be tempted to
commit similar offences. For this reason, a victim usually does not benefit
directly from criminal proceedings in the sense of receiving compensation
for the wrongs done to her,32 though she may well find testifying in court
against her harasser a form of catharsis as well as an opportunity to
highlight the problem of workplace sexual harassment.33 There is nothing
to stop a person from making a police report against her harasser as well
as commencing a civil action against him to recover damages.
A. The Constitutional Perspective
It is appropriate to begin our consideration of sexual harassment law
with the supreme law of the land, the Constitution of the Republic of
Singapore.34 Among other basic functions, the Constitution establishes
the various institutions which govern Singapore — the executive,
Section 401(1)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 1985 Rev Ed) confers on
the court convicting an accused the discretion to order him to pay a sum fixed by the
court as compensation to any person or to the representatives of any person injured
by the crime in respect of his person, character or property. Under s 401(4), if
compensation is ordered, any civil claim for damages sustained by reason of the crime
shall be deemed to have been satisfied to that extent, but the order shall not prejudice
any right to a civil remedy for recovery of damages beyond the amount of compensation
paid under the order. One case in which compensation was ordered is Raja Izzudin
Shah v Public Prosecutor [1979] 1 MLJ 270 (CA, Ipoh), in which the victim, a public
servant, was awarded RM 200 for having been assaulted during the execution of his
duties by the defendant. However, in practice compensation is seldom awarded by the
courts.
In appropriate cases, such as those involving victims of sexual offences, the Courts
may call for victim impact statements as part of the sentencing process. In such a
statement, the victim is permitted to highlight the medical, financial and emotional
injuries and the other effects which the crime has had on her: Peter Low, “Empowering
Victims via VIS”, The Singapore Law Gazette, August 1997 at 27.
1992 Ed.
32
33
34
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legislature and judiciary. It also defines the ambit of the responsibilities
and powers of these institutions, and regulates the procedure for
appointing or electing individuals to positions of power. Hence, it is
perhaps not surprising that an issue as specific as sexual harassment is
not mentioned at all. Nonetheless, among the fundamental liberties
enjoyed by the people of Singapore are the rights to life and personal
liberty and to equality and equal protection, which are set out in the
following terms:
Article 12(1): All persons are equal before the law and entitled to
the equal protection of the law.
Article 12(2): Except as expressly authorised by this Constitution,
there shall be no discrimination against citizens of Singapore on the
ground only of religion, race, descent or place of birth in any law or
in the appointment to any office or employment under a public
authority or in the administration of any law relating to the
acquisition, holding or disposition of property or the establishing or
carrying on of any trade, business, profession, vocation or
employment.
Singapore courts have not yet had the opportunity to interpret the word
life in Article 9(1). However, in the recent Malaysian decision of Tan
Teck Seng v Suruhanjaya Perkhidmatan Pendidikan,35 the Kuala Lumpur
Court of Appeal, in construing Article 5(1) of the Federal Constitution
which is identical to Singapore’s Article 9(1), held that the word did not
refer to mere existence but “incorporates all those facets that are an
integral part of life itself and those matters which go to form the quality
of life.”36 The right to life therefore includes protection of the health and
strength of workers, and just and humane conditions of work.37 For the
purposes of the case, the Court held that it encompassed the right to
continue in public service subject to removal for good cause by resort to
a fair procedure.38 It remains to be seen whether Singapore will interpret
Article 9(1) in such a broad manner.
Article 12(1) of the Constitution lays down the general principle that
people who are in a similar position with respect to the law are to be
treated by the law in the same manner.39 Article 12(2) goes on to prohibit,
35
36
37
38
39
[1996] 1 MLJ 261 (CA, Kuala Lumpur).
Ibid at 288.
Ibid at 287, citing Bandhua Mukti Morcha v Union of India AIR 1984 SC 802 (SC,
India).
Ibid at 288.
Datuk Haji bin Harun Idris v Public Prosecutor [1977] 2 MLJ 155 at 166 (FC, Malaysia);
Ong Ah Chuan v Public Prosecutor [1980–81] SLR 48, [1981] 1 MLJ 64 (PC on appeal
from Singapore).
Article 9(1): No person shall be deprived of his life or personal
liberty save in accordance with law.
38 Singapore Academy of Law Journal (1999)
among other things, discrimination in public employment on the grounds
of religion, race, descent or place of birth. It is to be noted that sex is
not one of the grounds specifically mentioned in Article 12(2). This is
surprising, since the Singapore Constitution was based on the Constitution
of India which does contain express prohibitions against sexual
discrimination, as the following provisions show:
Article 15(1): The State shall not discriminate against any citizen on
grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of
them.
Article 16(1): There shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens
in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under
the State.
Article 16(2): No citizen shall, on the grounds only of religion, race,
caste, sex, descent, place of birth, residence or any of them, be
ineligible for, or discriminated against in respect of, any employment
or office under the State. [Emphasis added.]
This difference notwithstanding, there is every reason to believe that the
general declaration of equality before the law and equal protection of
the law in Article 12(1) of the Constitution includes equality of the sexes
as well.
The constitutional provisions referred to above do not have a direct impact
on sexual harassment law in Singapore. Fundamental liberties were
established in the Constitution to place limits on the State’s right to
impinge on individual freedom, not to regulate the relations of private
persons with each other.40 This is manifest from Article 12(2) which,
among other things, forbids employment discrimination against citizens
of Singapore, but only as regards the appointment to any office or
employment under a public authority, and the administration of any law
relating to the establishment or carrying on of any trade, business,
profession, vocation or employment. Therefore, an individual who is
discriminated against by her employer, who is another individual or a
private corporation, may not complain of unconstitutional action on the
part of the latter. Her only recourse is to sue her employer under the
ordinary law.
40 See Vidya Verma v Shiv Narain Verma AIR 1956 SC 108 at 109–10 (SC, India), in
which it was held that as a rule constitutional safeguards are directed against the
State and its organs, and that protection against violation of rights by individuals must
be sought in the ordinary law. See also PD Shamdasani v Central Bank of India AIR
1952 SC 59 at 60 (SC, India). The courts in Singapore have not yet been called upon
to decide the point.
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Nonetheless, it is submitted that Articles 9 and 12, despite their limitations,
emphasize certain basic principles from which ordinary law should draw
inspiration. Article 9 may suggest that since employment is a vital part
of everyday life, the rights of employees to proper working conditions
and not to be dismissed without just cause and proper procedures should
be protected. Article 12 reminds us that there ought not to be unnecessary
distinctions in the way people who are similarly placed are treated.
Therefore, conduct is discriminatory when it is unreasonable and directed
at a particular person because of his or her sex and not at others in the
same situation.
B. Remedies in the Court: Civil Actions
1. Claims in Tort Against Harassers
As a result of its colonial heritage, tort law in Singapore is still very
much based on English common law principles.41 In Pang Koi Fa v Lim
Djoe Phing,42 Singapore’s first major decision on liability for nervous
shock, the High Court held that:
The courts in Singapore are not strictly bound by decisions of the
English courts in the sense that the courts in England are not part
of the hierarchy of courts in Singapore... Nonetheless, in respect of
decisions in common law, particularly in the area of tort in general
and negligence in particular, decisions of the highest court in England
[ie the House of Lords] should be highly persuasive if not practically
binding.
While Singapore courts tend to follow the English lead in novel cases,
there is by no means a blind adherence. Indeed, in Pang Koi Fa’s case,
the court went beyond the English authorities and looked to American
case law as well. It took the view that “[w]hile decisions in the US are in
no way binding nor ordinarily applicable in Singapore, this cannot and
should not preclude the courts from looking at judicial decisions in the
US, which offer a far more diverse and broader base of solutions upon
which legal developments may be founded. The cautionary principles to
bear in mind are that the law may have developed in directions vastly
different from those in the Commonwealth, so that cases must be viewed
with much more circumspection.”43
In this section, therefore, while there is much reference to English case
law, mention is also made of decisions of the United States and other
jurisdictions where they shed light on the issues raised.
41
42
43
This is affirmed by s 3 of the Application of English Law Act (Cap 7A, 1994 Ed).
[1993] 3 SLR 317 at 323 (HC).
Ibid at 330.
40 Singapore Academy of Law Journal (1999)
(1) Trespass to the Person:44 Sexual harassment occurs when a harasser
touches or grabs his victim, or intentionally brushes his body against hers.
The harasser may also restrain the victim’s free movement to importune
or molest her. Such acts can constitute trespasses to the victim’s person.
“The fundamental principle, plain and uncontestable, is that every person’s
body is inviolate.”45 For this reason, the victim may have causes of action
in battery, assault and false imprisonment depending on the form of
harassment suffered. Battery is the direct imposition of any unwanted
physical contact on a person. It is not necessary to prove that the contact
caused or threatened any physical injury or harm, nor that the defendant
intended to injure the other person.46 For instance, in R v Chief Constable
of Devon and Cornwall, ex parte CEGB,47 a person who kissed a newly-
met colleague on the lips was found liable in battery.
If the harasser does not actually touch the victim but does an overt act
which indicates to the victim an immediate intention on his part to commit
a battery, and the harasser is in a position to carry that intention into
effect, the tort of assault is established.48 For instance, a harasser commits
an assault if he approaches the victim and evinces an intention to touch
her, even if he does not eventually do so.
Finally, the harasser is liable for the tort of false imprisonment if he
completely deprives the victim of her liberty for any time, however short,
without lawful cause.49 It is enough that the victim’s movements are
constrained at the harasser’s will. The constraint can be actual physical
force amounting to a battery, or merely the apprehension of force.
Therefore, the tort may be committed if the harasser tells the victim,
“Don’t think you’re going anywhere”, causing her to feel that her freedom
of movement is curtailed.
(2) Intentional Infliction of Injury; Harassment and Molestation: On the
other hand, sexual harassment frequently does not involve physical contact
between the harasser and the victim. For instance, the harasser may
constantly approach the victim and make lewd suggestions or sexual
overtures, tell off-colour jokes or show pornographic pictures to the victim.
There have even been cases where the harasser has exposed himself to
the victim. Is there any recourse against such behaviour?
44
45
46
47
48
49
See generally Clerk & Lindsell on Torts (17th ed, 1995), chap 12.
Collins v Wilcock [1984] 3 All ER 374 at 378.
Wilson v Pringle [1986] 2 All ER 440 at 495 (CA).
[1982] QB 458 at 471.
Stephens v Myers (1830) 4 C&P 349, 172 ER 735; Read v Coker (1853) 13 CB 850, 138
ER 1437.
Bird v Jones (1845) 7 QB 742; Meering v Grahame-White Aviation Co (1919) 112 LT
44.
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Apart from the torts mentioned above, there is an line of cases
establishing that if a person intentionally does something which causes
nervous shock to a victim, the person is liable even where there has been
no physical impact or threat of force on the victim. In Wilkinson v
Downton,50 the defendant was held liable in tort for playing a practical
joke on the plaintiff by telling her that her husband had been seriously
injured in an accident, causing her to suffer nervous shock. The court
found that the defendant had wilfully done an act calculated to cause
physical harm to the plaintiff. He had infringed her “legal right to personal
safety”, and had been occasioned physical harm without justification.51
As regards the defendant’s intention in doing the act complained of, it
should be noted that a person must be presumed to have intended the
natural consequences of his or her conduct.52
In the context of this tort, which might be called intentional infliction of
injury, the defendant’s wilful act must lead to a recognised psychiatric
illness — a plaintiff cannot recover merely for having experienced fear,
shock or mental distress.53 Furthermore, although no cases have been
decided to that effect, academic opinion is unanimous in holding that the
tort applies to physical injury as well as nervous shock suffered by the
victim.54 For instance, if one person suddenly shouts at another descending
a narrow staircase, intending that the second person should fall, the first
person is surely liable if the second person does fall and injure himself.55
50
51
52
53
54
55
[1897] 2 QB 57.
See also Janvier v Sweeney [1919] 2 KB 316 (CA); Brelitski v Obadiak (1922) 65 DLR
627 (SC, Canada); Stevenson v Basham [1922] NZLR 225 (CA, New Zealand); Bunyan
v Jordan (1937) 57 CLR 1 (HC, Australia); Purdy v Woznesensky [1937] 2 WWR 116
(Canada); Cant v Cant (1985) 49 OR (2d) 25 (Canada); Wong Kwai Fun v Li Fung
[1994] 1 HKC 549 (CA, Hong Kong).
RP Balkin & JLR Davis, Law of Torts (2nd ed, 1996) at 51.
Such an approach has been adopted in many tort cases: cf Kralj v McGrath [1986] 1
All ER 54 (negligence of obstetrician led to plaintiff suffering great pain and the loss
of her baby shortly after birth. However, no damages awarded merely for the fact that
the plaintiff suffered grief at her child’s death); Hicks v Chief Constable of Yorkshire
Police [1992] 1 AC 310 (people who were trapped in a crush during a soccer match at
the Hillsborough Stadium but were fortunate enough to escape injury held to have no
claim in respect of the distress suffered, even though it was a truly terrifying
experience).
In the Singapore decision Pang Koi Fa v Lim Djoe Phing, supra n 42, a nervous shock
case, the High Court held at 333–34: “Perilously close are also the situations in which
the claim for nervous shock may be confused with a claim for grief, sorrow, deprivation
and suffering... This category of claim is clearly untenable. In distinguishing the present
case frqm the ones relating to just grief and suffering, I must say that here the claim
is not exclusively for the loss the plaintiff has suffered, nor the sense of loss she feels.
Rather, I view it as a claim for the psychiatric illness she now suffers...” [original
emphasis].
Winfield & Jolowicz on Tort (WVH Rogers ed, 13th ed, 1989) at 69; Balkin & Davis,
supra n 52 at 51.
Winfield & Jolowicz, ibid.
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Harassment and abuse which harms the victim’s health is conduct which
falls within the tort. The plaintiff in Burnett v George56 was subjected to
a series of molestations and assaults from the defendant, including actual
assaults to her person, unwelcome visits to her home, and harassing
telephone calls. An injunction was granted restraining the defendant from
assaulting, molesting or otherwise interfering with the plaintiff or entering
her property. The defendant appealed on the ground that since
molestation and interference were not actionable wrongs, it was not just
for the court to grant an injunction to restrain such acts. On the facts,
the Court of Appeal found that the terms of the injunction were too
wide. Nonetheless, applying Wilkinson v Downton and Janvier v Sweeney,
it held that an injunction might be granted in a proper case if it was
shown that the plaintiff’s health was being impaired by molestation or
interference calculated to create such impairment.
In Khorasandjian v Bush,57 the appellant had assaulted the respondent,
behaved aggressively towards her, made threats of violence, and pestered
her with unwanted telephone calls to her parents’ and grandmother’s
homes. The respondent suffered great stress as a result. On an application
by the respondent, a county court granted an interlocutory injunction
forbidding the appellant from using any violence to, harassing, pestering
or communicating with the respondent in any way until the trial of the
action or further order. The appellant appealed, claiming that the judge
did not have jurisdiction to restrain him in this manner since an
interlocutory injunction could only be granted a legal right of the
respondent, and the words “harassing, pestering or communicating with”
did not reflect any tort known to the law.
The appeal was dismissed by the English Court of Appeal. Firstly, it was
clear to the Court that the form of an interlocutory injunction did not
have to follow slavishly the form of the substantive relief which would
be likely to be granted if the respondent succeeded at trial.58 Secondly, it
found that the respondent did have potential causes of action against the
appellant for the harassing telephone calls, one of them being the tort of
intentional infliction of injury. Applying Wilkinson v Downton, Janvier v
Sweeney and Burnett v George, the Court felt that though there was no
medical evidence and it could not as yet be said that the respondent was
suffering from any physical or psychiatric illness resulting from the
harassment, there was an “obvious risk” that the cumulative effect of
continued and unrestrained further harassment would cause such illness.
On this ground, both the judges in the majority and the dissenting judge
felt it appropriate to grant a quia timet injunction preventing harm which
had not yet occurred.59
56
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[1992] 1 FLR 156 (CA).
[1993] QB 727 (CA).
Ibid at 732.
Ibid at 677 (Dillon LJ, Rose LJ agreeing), 736 (Peter Gibson J).
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The majority in Khorasandjian was also of the view that the respondent
had a potential cause of action in private nuisance against the appellant,
even though the latter had made harassing telephone calls to the homes
of the respondent’s parents and grandmother. The respondent had no
proprietary interest in these properties, and was in law a mere licensee
in her parents’ home. Nonetheless, Dillon LJ (with whom Rose LJ agreed)
felt that “[t]o my mind, it is ridiculous if in this age the law is that the
making of deliberately harassing and pestering telephone calls to a person
is only actionable in the civil courts if the recipient of the calls happens
to have the freehold or leasehold proprietary interest in the premises in
which he or she has received the calls.”60 It was enough that the
respondent was an occupier of the properties where the harassing
telephone calls were received, and the inconvenience and annoyance
caused by the calls and the interference thereby with the ordinary and
reasonable use of the property were sufficient to found a claim in private
nuisance.
In Burris v Azadani,61 the appellant persistently threatened and harassed
the respondent, in particular by making uninvited nocturnal visits to her
home. The respondent commenced proceedings for nuisance and got an
interlocutory injunction restraining the appellant inter alia from assaulting,
harassing or threatening her or communicating with her, and prohibiting
him from entering or remaining within 250 yards of her home. As a result
of breaches of the injunction, the respondent brought committal
proceedings against the appellant. The appellant contended that the court
had no jurisdiction to impose a term excluding him from the vicinity of
the respondent’s home. The Court of Appeal disagreed. Applying
Khorasandjian,62 in its view it was not a valid objection to the making of
an “exclusion zone” order that the conduct to be restrained was not itself
tortious or otherwise unlawful if such an order was reasonably regarded
as necessary for protection of the respondent’s legitimate interest. The
Court also cited the majority’s decision in Khorasandjian with approval.63
The English Court of Appeal took the view in both Khorasandjian64 and
Burris65 that there exists a common law tort of harassment, despite earlier
decisions which had declared that the common law does not recognise
the existence of such a tort,66 or indeed any tort of molestation,67
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
Ibid at 734.
[1995] 1 WLR 1372 (CA).
Ibid at 1377; see Khorasandjian, supra n 58, and the accompanying text.
Ibid at 1379–80.
Supra n 57 at 738.
Supra n 61. at 1378.
Patel v Patel [1988] 2 FLR 179 (CA), doubted in Khorasandjian, supra n 57 at 737–38,
and Burris, supra n 61 at 1378–79.
Burnett v George (1986) [1992] 1 FLR 525 (CA); Patel v Patel, ibid.
44 Singapore Academy of Law Journal (1999)
ill-treatment68 or invasion of privacy.69 This point was left untouched by
the House of Lords in Hunter v Canary Wharf Ltd,70 which overruled
Khorasandjian insofar as it held that a mere occupier of property may
sue in private nuisance. The House of Lords reaffirmed that the tort of
private nuisance can only grant relief to a plaintiff in the limited situation
where she has a proprietary interest in the property on which the nuisance
is suffered.71 On the tort of harassment, Lord Hoffmann expressed the
following obiter view:
The perceived gap in Khorasandjian’s case was the absence of a
tort of intentional harassment causing distress without actual bodily
or psychiatric illness. This limitation is thought to arise out of cases
like Wilkinson v Downton [1897] 2 QB 57, [1895-9] All ER Rep 267
and Janvier v Sweeney [1919] 2 KB 316, [1918-19] All ER Rep 1056.
... But as at present advised, I see no reason why a tort of intention
should be subject to the rule which excludes compensation for mere
distress, inconvenience or discomfort in actions based on negligence
(see Hicks v Chief Constable of the South Yorkshire Police [1992] 2
All ER 65). The policy considerations are quite different. I do not
therefore say that Khorasandjian’s case was wrongly decided. But it
must be seen as a case on intentional harassment, not nuisance.72
Regretfully, both Lord Hoffmann and Lord Goff of Chieveley73 found it
unnecessary to consider in more depth how the common law might have
developed, since after Khorasandjian the law of harassment in Great
Britain was put on a statutory basis in the form of the Protection from
Harassment Act 1997.74 Section 1(1) of the Act states:
A person must not pursue a course of conduct —
(a)
(b)
which amounts to harassment of another, and
which he knows or ought to know amounts to harassment of
the other.
Harassment is not defined, save that it includes alarming a person or
causing a person distress. A course of conduct must involve conduct on
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
Davey v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary [1988] NILR 139.
Re X (A Minor) [1975] 1 All ER 697 at 704; Kaye v Robertson [1991] FSR 62 at 66
(CA): “It is well-known that in English law there is no right to privacy, and accordingly
there is no right of action for a breach of a person’s privacy.”
[1997] 2 All ER 426 (HL).
Quaere whether this ought to be so: see Margaret Fordham, “The Need for a Legal
Interest in Land in Actions for Private Nuisance — the End of the Debate?” [1997]
SJLS 436.
Supra n 70 at 452.
Ibid at 438 per Lord Goff, and 452 per Lord Hoffmann.
Chapter 40 (“PFHA”).
11 S.Ac.L.J. Workplace Sexual Harassment in S’pore: The Legal Challenge 45
at least two occasions, and conduct includes speech.75 The Act creates
both criminal and civil liability for harassment.76 It is also a criminal
offence for a defendant who has been restrained by injunction from
pursuing any conduct which amounts to harassment to do anything
prohibited by the injunction without reasonable excuse, and a plaintiff
who considers that the defendant has breached the terms of the injunction
may apply for a warrant for the defendant’s arrest.77
As pointed out by Lord Hoffmann, had it not been for the Protection
from Harassment Act, the common law may well have developed the
tort of harassment by dispensing with the requirement for physical or
psychiatric injury in favour of a clear finding of mental distress on the
plaintiff’s part.78 This is already the position in the United States: under
American law, “if the enormity of the outrage itself carries conviction
that there has in fact been severe and serious mental distress, which is
neither feigned nor trivial, bodily harm is not required.”79
In the New Zealand decision of Tucker v New Media Ownership Ltd,80
the court seemed prepared to go even further, speculating that the tort
in Wilkinson v Downton might usefully be adapted to cover the same
field in the United States by the tort of invasion of personal privacy.
One aspect of the American tort protects against any unreasonable or
highly offensive intentional intrusion against the seclusion of another
person.81 This tort was found to have been committed in Rogers v Loews
L’Enfant Plaza Hotel82 when a supervisor repeatedly called the
complainant at home and at work when he was off-duty, making lewd
remarks about her personal and sex life despite requests that he stop;
and in Phillips v Smalley Maintenance Services,83 where an employer asked
a female employee about her sexual relationship with her husband, and
also told her that providing sexual services to him in his office was part
of her job.84
75
76
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PFHA, ss 7(2) to (4).
PFHA, ss 2 and 3 respectively. In addition, s 4(1) creates an offence of engaging in a
course of conduct which causes another to fear, on at least two occasions, that violence
will be used against him.
PFHA, ss 3(4) to (9).
See also Fricker [1992] Fam Law 158; Stephen Todd, “Protection of Privacy” in Torts
in the Nineties (Nicholas J Mullany ed, 1997), 174 at 200–201.
Prosser & Keeton on the Law of Torts (W Page Keeton gen ed, 5th ed, 1984) at § 12;
American Law Institute, Second Restatement of Law: Torts (1965) at § 46.
[1986] 2 NZLR 716 at 731–33.
Prosser & Keeton, supra n 79 at 854 (§ 117); Second Restatement of Law: Torts, supra
n 79 at § 652B.
(1981) 526 F Supp 523.
(1983) 711 F 2nd 1524.
See also Pease v Alford Photo Industries (1987) 667 F Supp 1188 (unwanted touching
of thighs, breasts and buttocks); and Waltman v International Paper Co (1988) 47 FEP
Cases 671, reversed (1989) 875 F 2d 468.
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No case in Singapore has yet applied the tort of intentional infliction of
injury expressed in Wilkinson v Downton, much less any tort of
harassment or invasion of privacy. It is submitted that such torts would
be a potent remedy for victims of sexual harassment. In view of Lord
Hoffman’s opinion in Hunter’s case, the desirability of recognizing such
torts should be seriously considered by our courts if the opportunity arises.
(3) Intimidation: At common law, a person commits the tort of
intimidation if he delivers a threat to another person that he will commit
an act or use means unlawful against that person, as a result of which the
other person acts or refrains from doing some act which he is entitled to
do, thereby causing damage to himself.85 To establish the tort, it must be
shown that the victim is subjected to a “coercive threat... coupled with a
demand. It must be intended to coerce a person into doing something
that he is unwilling to do or not doing something that he wishes to do.”86
Mere “idle abuse” against a person which is not taken seriously does not
suffice.87 The threat need not be in words, and can be implied from the
tortfeasor’s acts. For instance, the plaintiff in Godwin v Uziogwe88 was
brought from a Nigerian village to England and made to work for the
defendants as a “domestic drudge”. She was coerced into working
excessive hours for no pay, and was confined to the defendants’ house
for two-and-a-half years with no opportunity for normal social intercourse.
She slept on the floor, was poorly clothed and fed, and was occasionally
beaten. The court found the defendants guilty of intimidation and
intentional unlawful coercion of the plaintiff because there were “implied
threats of further assaults”.
The act threatened against the victim must itself be unlawful. If a person
threatens to do something which he has a legal right to do, no intimidation
is committed.89 The unlawful acts can constitute a tort, a breach of
contract, or in some cases even a crime.90 It is also necessary for the
85
86
87
88
89
90
Rookes v Barnard [1964] AC 1129 (HL); Morgan v Fry [1968] 2 QB 710 at 724. See
Clerk & Lindsell on Torts, supra n 44 at para 23–38.
Stratford v Lindley [1965] AC 269 at 283–84. See also Allen v Flood [1898] AC 1 at
129; Hodges v Webb [1920] 2 Ch 70 at 89; Rookes v Barnard, ibid at 1187–88, 1200–
01, 1207–08.
News Group Newspapers Ltd v Society of Graphical and Allied Trades 1982 (No 2)
[1987] ICR 181 at 204.
(1992) 136 SJ (LB) 205.
Rookes v Barnard, supra n 85 at 1168–69, 1234; Hadnor Productions Ltd v Hamilton
[1983] 1 AC 191 at 224–25, 229.
For a crime to constitute an unlawful act, it must be shown that on a true construction
of the penal statute creating the offence the victim is given a civil cause of action:
Lonrho Ltd v Shell Petroleum Ltd (No 2) [1982] AC 173 (HL); RCA Corpn v Pollard
[1983] Ch 135 (CA); CBS Songs Ltd v Amstrad Consumer Electronics [1988] Ch 61 at
72–78 (CA), affirmed on other grounds in [1988] AC 1013 (HL); Barrets & Baird
(Wholesale) Ltd v IPCS [1987] IRLR 3 at 6; Lonrho v Fayed [1990] 2 QB 479 at 489.
Quaere whether a threat to commit any of the criminal offences referred to in Part
III.B infra would entitle the victim to sue for intimidation.
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victim to submit to the threat, and suffer to damage as a result.91 If, for
example, A says to B, “I will hit you unless you give me $5,” and B
resists saying, “You can do your worst. I am not going to pay you,” at
that point B has no cause of action against A.92 Of course, B can apply
for an injunction to prevent A from carrying out his threat,93 and if A
later hits him, B can sue for assault.
As with the torts discussed in the last section, the tort of intimidation
has not yet been applied in Singapore, though there is no reason why it
should not be accepted in an appropriate case. The tort provides a
potential cause of action for employees who succumb to sexual demands
as a result of threats made by their employers or co-workers. It is not
difficult to imagine situations where an employee might be pressured into
an undesired sexual relationship with her employer if he threatens her
with demotion or dismissal, or with a supervisor who threatens to assault
her or to spread defamatory rumours about her.
(4) Private Nuisance: Victims who suffer harassment on their own
property, for example by harassers who loiter in the vicinity of their homes
or use the telephone to make nuisance calls, may have a cause of action
in private nuisance. The essence of the tort is an undue interference with
the victim in the comfortable and convenient enjoyment of her own land94
or, as put in St Helens Smelting Co v Tipping,95 “personal inconvenience
and interference with one’s enjoyment, one’s quiet, one’s personal
freedom, anything that discomposes or injuriously affects the senses or
the nerves.” The discomfort to the plaintiff must be of such a degree
that it would be substantial to any person occupying the plaintiff’s
premises irrespective of his or her position in life, age or state of health;
it must be “an inconvenience materially with the ordinary comfort
physically of human existence, not merely according to elegant or dainty
91
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Thompson-Schwab v Costaki [1956] 1 WLR 335 at 338; Laws v Florinplace [1981] 1
All ER 659. For local cases, see Pacific Engineering Ltd v Haji Ahmad Rice Mill Ltd
[1966] 2 MLJ 142 (HC, Kuala Lumpur) (injury to property and annoyance caused by
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nuisance); Syarikat Perniagan Selangor Sdn Bhd v Fahro Rozi Mohdi [1981] 2 MLJ 16
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(1865) 11 HLC 642 at 650, 11 ER 1483 at 1486.
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modes and habits of living, but according to plain and sober and simple
notions” among Singaporeans.96
Any act done with the intention of annoying and which actually causes
annoyance amounts to a nuisance.97 In Khorasandjian v Bush,98 referred
to earlier, the court found that the inconvenience and annoyance caused
to the respondent by the appellant’s pestering telephone calls to her
parents’ and grandmother’s homes of itself amounted to interference with
the respondent’s ordinary and reasonable enjoyment of property, and
therefore could be restrained quia timet by injunction as a private
nuisance. However, the court departed from established authority,99
holding that it was unnecessary for the respondent to prove that she had
a freehold or leasehold proprietary interest in the premises in which she
had received the calls. It was sufficient that the respondent was lawfully
present on the property and had a right of occupation there as her
mother’s licensee. As pointed out above, this aspect of Khorasandjian
was recently overruled by the House of Lords in Hunter v Canary
Wharf.100 Therefore, in order to sue in private nuisance, a victim must
have some proprietary interest in the property on which the harassment
is encountered.
It appears that an employee who is unreasonably harassed along a highway
while entering into or exiting from her workplace may have a cause of
action. Whether this is a species of private nuisance or new tort is unclear.
The case in point is Thomas v National Union of Mineworkers (South
Wales Area),101 in which some working miners sought injunctions
restraining the union, which had called a miners’ strike, from organizing
unlawful picketing or demonstrations. Scott J held:
All citizens have a right to use the public highway. Suppose an
individual were to persistently follow another on a public highway,
making rude gestures or remarks in order to annoy or vex. If
continuance of such conduct were threatened no one can doubt but
that a civil court would, at the suit of the victim, restrain by an
injunction the continuance of the conduct. The tort might be
described as a species of private nuisance, namely unreasonable
interference with the victim’s rights to use the highway. But the
label for the tort does not, in my view, matter. In the present case,
the working miners have the right to use the highway for the purpose
96
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of going to work. They are, in my judgment, entitled under the
general law to exercise that right without unreasonable harassment
by others. Unreasonable harassment of them in their exercise of
that right would, in my judgment, be tortious.
The majority in Khorasandjian102 found it unnecessary to decide on the
correctness of this decision, but in his dissenting judgment Peter Gibson
J noted that the case had been criticized in News Group Newspapers Ltd
v Society of Graphical and Allied Trades 1982 (No 2).103 Nevertheless, he
left open the question whether harassment of the user of a highway is a
tort, or whether workers have an interest in having access to their place
of work analogous to the interests of those occupying business premises.104
(5) Damages: A harasser is liable for all consequences flowing from the
tort he has committed, whether or not such consequences were
foreseeable. Damages are recoverable for whatever loss results as a natural
consequence of the harasser’s wrongful acts.105 If the torts involving
trespass to the person, intentional infliction of injury and harassment are
made out, the victim is at the very least entitled to nominal damages, but
substantial damages may be awarded for any indignity, discomfort or
inconvenience suffered. Damages will be given to vindicate the victim’s
rights, even if no pecuniary damage is suffered.106 The court will look at
the time, place and manner of the trespass and the defendant’s conduct.
In appropriate cases, the court may even award aggravated damages.107
For instance, aggravated damages were awarded in W v Meah108 to women
victims of serious sexual assault by the defendant, and in Appleton v
Garrett109 to patients of a dentist for injury to feelings, mental distress,
anger and indignation upon learning that much of the dental treatment
given to them was unnecessary and to a large extent performed on healthy
102
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teeth — the dentist had deliberately and in bad faith concealed from
them the true condition of their teeth so that he could carry out dental
work for profit.
As the tort of private nuisance is concerned with damage to or
interference with rights over property, it is not altogether clear whether
damages may be awarded for personal injury suffered by the plaintiff.110
Nevertheless, where the nuisance interferes with the plaintiff’s amenity
and enjoyment of her property, non-pecuniary damages can be recovered
for the annoyance, inconvenience or discomfort suffered.111
2. Claims in Tort Against Employers
(1) Primary Liability for Negligence:112 At common law, an employer owes
to each employee a duty to take reasonable care for his or her safety in
all the circumstances of the case so as not to expose him or her to
unnecessary risk.113 This duty is sometimes expressed as a fourfold duty
to provide safe equipment, safe fellow-employees, a safe workplace and
safe system of work,114 but it is nonetheless one overall duty.115 The test
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is what is reasonable and proper to be done for the safety of the
employees in the circumstances of the particular case.116 The employer’s
duty is non-delegable — if the employer asks another of his employees117
or even an independent contractor118 to take responsibility for ensuring
that the duty is performed, but the third party acts negligently, the
employer remains fully liable.
Although there are no cases either in England or Singapore directly on
point, it is submitted that an employer’s common law duty towards his
employees extends to ensuring that they will not be subject to sexual
harassment while at work. Although most of the cases on an employer’s
duty to provide a safe workplace and a safe system of work have involved
some form of industrial premises or process, in principle there is no reason
why the duty should be so limited.
Support for this proposition appears in the case of Hudson v Ridge
Manufacturing Co Ltd.119 For nearly four years one of the defendants’
employees, Chadwick, had made a nuisance of himself to his fellow
employees, including the plaintiff, by persistently engaging in horseplay
or “skylarking”, for instance by tripping people up. He had been
reprimanded many times by the foreman and warned that he could hurt
somebody, but this had no effect on him. The defendants took no further
steps to check his conduct by dismissing him or otherwise. One day,
Chadwick, while indulging in horseplay, caught hold of the plaintiff from
behind and forced him to the ground. The plaintiff put his hand out to
save himself and fractured his wrist. He sued his employers. The court
held:120
It is the duty of employers, for the safety of their employees, to
have reasonably safe plant and machinery. It is their duty to have
practices which are similarly reasonably safe. It is their duty to have
a reasonably safe system of work. It is their duty to employ
reasonably competent fellow workmen. All of these duties exist at
common law for the safety of the workman, and if, for instance, it is
found that a piece of plant or part of the premises is not reasonably
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safe, it is the duty of the employers to cure it, to make it safe and
to remove that source of danger. In the same way, if the system of
working is found, in practice, to be beset with dangers, it is the duty
of the employer to evolve a reasonably safe system of working so as
to obviate these dangers, and upon principle it seems to me that if,
in fact, a fellow workman is not merely incompetent but, by his
habitual conduct, is likely to prove a source of danger to his fellow
employees, a duty lies fairly and squarely on the employers to remove
that source of danger. ...
Here is a case where there existed, as it were in the system of work,
a source of danger, through the conduct of one of the defendant’s
employees, of which they knew, repeated conduct which went on
over a long period of time, and which they did nothing whatever to
remove, except to reprimand and go on reprimanding to no effect.
In my judgment, therefore, the injury was sustained as a result of
the defendant’s failure to take proper steps to put an end to that
conduct, to see that it would not happen again and, if it did happen
again, to remove the source of it. [Emphasis added.]
Hudson’s case is important for several reasons: firstly, it suggests that an
employer’s duty to provide a safe workplace and system of work is broad
enough to cover not only operating procedures in factories and the like,
but also the general manner in which workplaces are run,121 including
managing how employees behave towards each other. It is submitted that
employers have a duty to establish policies for preventing, investigating
and dealing with sexual harassment, and to take appropriate action in
line with these policies when complaints are received.
Secondly, the case illustrates that employers have a duty towards their
employees to hire competent fellow-employees. It is submitted that this
encompasses not only ensuring that employees possess suitable
qualifications for the job they are hired to do, but also that they are
properly trained and supervised in the course of their work. Employers
may therefore be under a duty to inquire into the background of job
applicants to see if they have a history of sexual harassment, and to ensure
that all employees are briefed about the company’s sexual harassment
policies.
Finally, it was specifically held in Hudson that employers must take
positive action against employees whose behaviour poses a danger to their
fellow employees. It is not sufficient for an employer to merely reprimand
121 For instance, the duty extends to taking reasonable steps to protect employees from
assault or criminal injury in the execution of their tasks: Houghton v Hackney Corp
(1961) 3 KIR [Knight’s Industrial Reports] 615; Williams v Grimshaw (1967) 3 KIR
610; Charlton v Forrest Printing Ink Co [1980] IRLR 331.
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an employee who behaves unacceptably if this has no effect on him; the
employer may be required to discipline him or even terminate his
employment. This clearly has implications for how employers should deal
with employees who sexually harass their colleagues.
An employer’s duty to prevent workplace sexual harassment from
occurring can also be viewed as an aspect of his duty of care towards his
employees distinct from the four traditional categories. In Veness v Dyson,
Bell & Co,122 one of the reasons why the plaintiff sued her former
employers was because her former colleagues allegedly bullied and
belittled her to such a degree that she came to the verge of a nervous
breakdown and had to resign. It was submitted on her behalf that there
is a well-established duty owed by an employer to his employee not to
expose him to unnecessary risk. This duty was not confined merely to
the provision of safe premises and equipment or a safe system of work,
but extended to taking disciplinary action against fellow-employees where
their actions might foreseeably cause physical or mental injury to the
employee. As this was an interlocutory application, the court made no
final ruling on the point, but found it to be arguable and did not strike
out the relevant portion of the plaintiff’s statement of claim.
The learned judge in Hudson’s case was careful to point out that if
Chadwick had merely tripped somebody up for the first time and had
been at once reprimanded by the foreman and then did not do it again,
such isolated conduct would not put upon his employers the duty of taking
the extreme course of dismissing him. His employers would not have
been able to foresee from one or perhaps two incidents of that kind the
danger that was likely to result from such conduct.
This is what happened in Smith v Crossley Brothers Ltd123 which was
distinguished in Hudson’s case. In Smith, the plaintiff, an apprentice
employed in the defendant’s company, was working at a vice when another
apprentice approached him from behind, placed a compressed air pipe
near his rectum and signalled to a third apprentice to turn on the
compressed air. As a result of the practical joke, the plaintiff suffered a
rupture of his colon. The plaintiff sued the defendants for damages for
negligence, but they contended that the injuries were solely caused by
the skylarking or unauthorised acts of the two apprentices in question,
which were entirely outside the scope of their employment. The Court of
Appeal agreed with the defendants, finding that the plaintiff’s injury
resulted from wilful misbehaviour by his two colleagues and that the
defendants had no reason whatsoever to foresee that the apprentices
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would act in the way that they did. The defendants had therefore not
acted negligently by failing to take reasonable care for the plaintiff’s
safety.
Therefore, employers may be absolved from liability for one-off incidents
of sexual harassment by their employees if such behaviour could not have
been foreseen, but not if the employees are known to be habitual
harassers.
Corresponding to an employer’s duty to provide a safe working
environment is a duty on employees to take such degree of care as a
reasonable person would take for his or her own safety.124 In the context
of sexual harassment, this suggests that the behaviour of the person
harassed may be relevant in determining whether his or her employer
has breached its duty. For instance, a court might be reluctant to hold a
company negligent for not preventing sexual harassment if the victim
contributed to the harassment by engaging in inappropriate behaviour
such as flirting with a colleague. However, this cannot be taken too far.
As in molest or rape cases, it is wrong to blame the victim for “bringing
trouble on herself” by wearing provocative clothing or making sexually
suggestive comments to the other party if in the end she makes it clear
to him that she does not wish to take the matter further. “No” should
mean no.
The Doctrine of Common Employment: Singapore law poses an added
complication to those wishing to claim against their employers for
harassment by their co-employees. Under the doctrine of common
employment, if a person occasioning and the person suffering injury are
fellow employees engaged in a common employment for and under the
same employer, the employer is not liable at common law for the injury
if he has taken reasonable care to select proper and competent
employees.125 The doctrine has been abolished in England,126 but continues
to apply in Singapore.127 However, the harsh effect of this doctrine has
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been greatly reduced by the principle that where an employer has not
provided a safe and proper system of work for its employer to begin
with, it cannot rely on the doctrine of common employment as a
defence.128 Hence, a victim of harassment in Singapore may still be able
to seek damages against her employer, even if the victim and her harasser
share a common employment, on proof that the employer has been
negligent in providing a working environment free from sexual
harassment, which would include hiring proper and competent employees.
(2) Vicarious Liability: If an employee is sexually harassed by a colleague
or a superior, and the harassment amounts to one of the torts referred to
in above, can her employer be vicariously liable for his employee’s
wrongful act? Suing an employer in vicarious liability has several
advantages over proceeding against the primary tortfeasor. A victim is
more likely to obtain payment from her employer of any damages
awarded to her because he will usually have deeper pockets than her
harasser. More importantly, subjecting employers to legal action may spur
them to establish effective procedures to prevent and deal with sexual
harassment in the workplace.
In general, whenever a relationship of employer and employee exists, an
employer is liable for the torts of its employee so long only as they are
committed in the course of the employee’s employment.129 The classic
exposition from Salmond on Torts reads as follows:
It is clear that the master is responsible for acts actually authorized
by him, for liability would exist in this case, even if the relation
between the parties was merely one of agency, and not one of service
at all. But a master, as opposed to the employer of an independent
contractor, is liable even for acts which he has not authorized,
provided they are so connected with acts which he has authorized
that they may rightly be regarded as modes — although improper
modes — of doing them. In other words, a master is responsible not
merely for what he authorizes his servants to do, but also for the
way in which he does it. On the other hand, if the unauthorized and
wrongful act of the servant is not so connected with the authorized
act as to be a mode of doing it, but is an independent act, the master
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is not responsible, for in such a case the servant is not acting in the
course of his employment, but has gone outside of it.130
The court will ask: “What was the job at which the employee was engaged
for his employer?”131 If the employee was on a “frolic of his own”132 or
the incident was “so divergent from the employment as to be plainly
alien to and wholly distinguishable from the employment”,133 the employer
will not be vicariously liable for the tort. The difficulty lies in determining
which side of the line a particular case falls on.
There is ample case authority for the proposition that where a person
acts in a manner wholly outside his duties as an employee, his employer
will not be held vicariously liable for any tort which the person may
commit. For instance, in Aldred v Nacanco134 where an employee played
a practical joke in the staff washroom by pushing a washbasin known to
be unsteady against a colleague, thus causing her injuries, this was found
to be a deliberate act which had nothing to do with her employment.
Her employers were not held vicariously liable.
This principle was affirmed in Singapore by the Privy Council in Keppel
Bus Co Ltd v Sa’ad bin Ahmad.135 The respondent in the case was a
passenger on a bus belonging to the appellants. The appellants’ employee
was the bus conductor. The respondent got into an altercation with the
conductor over the latter’s behaviour towards an elderly female passenger.
Subsequently, the conductor abused the respondent using a very rude
Chinese expression, and when told off by the respondent, struck him in
the eye with a ticket punch, breaking his glasses and causing the loss of
sight of the eye. The Privy Council on appeal from Singapore held that
vicarious liability will lie if an employee is carrying out work he is
expressly or impliedly authorised and therefore employed to do, albeit
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by a wrong mode. The respondent suggested that the bus conductor’s
function was to “manage the bus”, and that what he did arose out of that
power and duty of management. However, the Privy Council drew a
distinction between acts of management and acts of the manager which
were foreign to his authority. On the facts, the conductor had insulted
the respondent and subsequently hit him. These were clearly not acts of
management. Therefore, the conductor had been acting outside the course
of his employment, and the appellants were not vicariously liable.
Another illustration is provided by Irving v The Post Office,136 which cited
Keppel Bus with approval. In this case, Mr and Mrs Irving, who were
black and of Jamaican origin, did not get along with their neighbour, a
postman named Edwards. Edwards’ duties included the sorting of mail.
He was authorised to write upon letters for the purpose of ensuring that
they were properly dealt with; otherwise, he was not allowed to write on
mail at all. While sorting mail one day, Edwards saw an envelope
addressed to the Irvings. He wrote on the back of the envelope, “Go
back to Jamaica Sambo”. The Irvings discovered that Edwards was the
culprit, and brought an action against his employers, the Post Office,
under the UK Race Relations Act 1976. However, the Court of Appeal
found that the Post Office was not vicariously liable. Edwards’ act of
writing the offensive message was done out of personal malevolence and
could not be regarded as merely an unauthorised way of performing the
duties for which he was employed. His employment provided an
opportunity for his misconduct, but the misconduct formed no part of
the performance of his duties, was in no way directed towards the
performance of those duties, and was not done for his employers’ benefit.
In Waters v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis,137 the appellant, a
woman police constable, lived in a room in the section house of the police
station to which she was posted. In the early hours of 15 February 1995,
while she was off duty, a male police constable, who was also off duty,
came to her room. They decided to go for a walk together and then
returned to the section house. The appellant alleged she was then seriously
sexually assaulted in her room by the male police officer. She reported
the assault, but following an internal inquiry, no action was taken against
the male officer. Subsequently, the appellant’s name was removed from
a list of specially trained officers used in relation to important police
searches. She then brought an action against her employers complaining
that this was an act of victimization contrary to section 4(1)(d) of the
UK Sex Discrimination Act 1975. However, the complaint was dismissed
by an industrial tribunal on the preliminary point that the male police
officer had not been acting within the course of his employment. The
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alleged assault had taken place when both parties were off duty, the act
was not committed at the constable’s place of employment, and, if it did
take place, it was deliberate, unauthorized and unlawful. Therefore, the
appellant’s employers could not be vicariously liable. The decision was
upheld on appeal to the Employment Appeal Tribunal.
These cases are to be contrasted with the following case in which it was
held that a harasser acts within the scope of his employment even if he
carries out his duties in a wholly improper manner. In Bracebridge
Engineering Ltd v Darby,138 the respondent was a female employee who
had been working for the appellant company for 13 years. On 11
November 1987, she was about to wash her hands before finishing her
shift when she was grabbed by a chargehand and the works manager and
taken to the latter’s office. The lights were turned off, and the works
manager picked up the respondent’s legs and put them around him. The
respondent tried to get away but was threatened with a written warning
for leaving early. The chargehand then put his hands between her legs
and touched her private parts, remarking, “You’ve got a big one.” She
was eventually able to open the door and run out. As the respondent
thought there was no one to report the incident to in the factory that
evening, she went home. She felt disgusted and degraded, and spoke to
her sister about it, saying that she really felt that she could not go back.
She was crying and upset when telling her sister about it. The following
morning, the respondent complained to the general manager. However,
as both the deputy foreman and works manager denied the incident, the
general manager decided to take no action. The respondent found this
wholly unsatisfactory and resigned a week later.
One of the appellants’ contentions was that the acts perpetrated by the
chargehand and the works manager were not acts committed in the course
of their employment. Yet, after a review of the relevant cases, the
Employment Appeal Tribunal concluded that the men had been acting
in the course of employment, since at the material time they were engaged
in or were in the course of exercising a disciplinary and supervisory
function.
This point was emphasized in Tower Boot Co Ltd v Jones.139 Raymondo
Jones, whose mother was white and father black, worked as a machine
operative for the employers until he resigned a month later. During that
time, he was subjected to a number of incidents of racial harassment
from work colleagues. Among other things, one employee burnt his arm
with a hot screwdriver, metal bolts were thrown at his head, his legs
were whipped with a piece of welt, and he was called names such as
138
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“chimp”, “monkey” and “baboon”. However, the Employment Appeal
Tribunal found that his employers were not vicariously liable for the racial
harassment as the acts complained of by Jones could not by any stretch
of the imagination be described as merely an improper mode of
performing authorized tasks.
Jones’ solicitor urged the Tribunal to apply Bracebridge. However, the
Tribunal held: “We are bound to say Bracebridge seems to stretch the
test to its limit but the explanation for that decision clearly lies in the
fact that the perpetrators were at the time involved in disciplinary
supervision. That was not so in the present case and we conclude that
Mr Jones’s fellow employees were not acting in the course of employment
and their misdeeds cannot be laid at the door of Tower Boot...”
An interesting comparison between the Bracebridge position on the one
hand and the other vicarious liability cases on the other is provided by
the recent Malaysian decision of Roshairee bin Abdul Wahab v Mejar
Mustafa bin Omar.140 The plaintiff was a lieutenant attached to the Royal
Malay Regiment. Before he was fully commissioned into the regiment,
he had to undergo an orientation programme. The first defendant was
the officer in charge of the programme, while the second defendant was
an intelligence officer with the regiment. The plaintiff alleged that while
he was undergoing the orientation programme, he was ragged and
assaulted by the first and second defendants. In the first incident
complained of, the plaintiff was ordered to hold a used cylinder shell
weighing one to two kilogrammes with his arms fully outstretched. When
he was unable to continue, the first and second defendants boxed him on
his head and ear. The second defendant also grabbed the plaintiff by his
necktie and dragged him until he fell choking, crying and screaming. The
second incident occurred three days later. This time, the first defendant
instructed the plaintiff to do push ups, and while the plaintiff was on the
floor he kicked and boxed his right ear. The plaintiff attempted to escape
from the beatings by running away, and was pursued by the first
defendant. However, the plaintiff was able to shout for help, and a senior
staff officer from the Ministry of Defence intervened. As a result of the
ill-treatment, the plaintiff suffered profound deafness in his right ear and
partial deafness in the other. He sued the first and second defendants,
and joined as third defendants the Government of Malaysia as their
employers, claiming it was vicariously liable for his injuries.
Citing the passage from Salmond and Heuston on the Law of Torts
referred to above, the court held that what it had to decide on the entire
evidence was whether the acts of the first and second defendants were
carried out in the course of their employment, to the extent that they
140 Supra n 130.
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were so connected with their authorised duties that they could be regarded
as a mode of doing them. On the facts, the plaintiff had been directly
under the charge, supervision and control of the first defendant, who
was the officer in charge of the orientation programme. On both occasions
when the plaintiff was assaulted, the orientation programme was still
underway. Therefore, though the first defendant’s acts of assault were
not authorised by the Government, they were carried out during the first
defendant’s normal course of duties. His unauthorised acts were so
connected with his authorised acts that they were merely improper modes
of carrying out his duties. Hence, the Government was vicariously liable
for the first defendant’s unlawful actions. On the other hand, the second
defendant played no part in the orientation programme at all. Except for
conducting two lectures which the plaintiff attended, neither of which
was taking place when he assaulted the plaintiff, he was not assigned
with any official duties towards the plaintiff. The court found that the
second defendant had acted completely independently, and therefore the
Government could not be held liable for his wrongdoing.
It appears from the above cases that an employer will only be held
vicariously liable for acts of sexual harassment perpetrated by one
employee on another if the harasser exercises some form of disciplinary
or supervisory responsibility over the victim. In the absence of such a
situation, the court will find that the harassment is misbehaviour outside
the course of the harasser’s employment, and absolve the employer from
vicarious liability. Nonetheless, an employee may be able to circumvent
such difficulties by claiming that her employer is in breach of his primary
duty of care to prevent acts of sexual harassment committed by its
employees.141
(3) Damage: To succeed in making out a case in tort against her employer,
it is not sufficient for an employee to simply show that her employer has
breached a primary duty of care towards her, or is vicariously liable for
a co-employee’s act. The employee must also prove that as a result of
the breach of duty she has suffered some damage for which she is entitled
by law to receive compensation. There is no problem if an employer’s
negligence leads to an employee being sexually harassed by a co-worker,
and as a result the employee suffers some physical or psychological injury.
For instance, the employee may be the victim of an actual sexual assault,
or she may be so affected by the harassment that she has a nervous
breakdown. If the employee succeeds in proving that her employer acted
negligently, she can clearly recover damages from him for such injury
sustained by her. If, as a result of her injury, the employee is hospitalized
or is otherwise unable to work and is not paid her wages, she can also
claim such losses from her employer.
141 Supra nn 112–128 and the accompanying text.
An employee not physically or psychologically injured who simply decides
to resign from her job also suffers damage in the form of lost salary and
other benefits. However, this is a pure economic loss which is probably
not recoverable under tort law. Pure economic loss has been defined as
financial loss suffered by a plaintiff which is unconnected with, and does
not flow from, damage to his or her person or property. In general, tort
law only allows for the recovery of pure economic losses in four
circumstances, namely:142
i.
 Where the loss follows physical damage to property in which
the plaintiff had no proprietary interest at the time of the
damage but to which he had some relationship, eg as a user
or subsequent acquirer (also known as a relational economic
loss);
ii. Where the loss was suffered through reliance on a statement;
iii. Where the loss resulted from the negligent provision of
services; and
iv. Where the defendant provided de fective products or buildings,
and the plaintiff suffered an eccnomic loss spending money
to repair or replace them.
Therefore, if an employee wishes to claim pure economic losses, she may
have to frame her claim as a breach of her employment contract rather
than a breach of duty by her employer. This point is dealt with in the
next section of this article.
3. Claims in Contract
In addition to being a tort, an act of sexual harassment may also constitute
a breach of the victim’s contract of employment with her employer. Like
tort law, the foundation of contract law in Singapore is to be found in
the principles of the English common law and equity.143 English cases
expounding principles of contract law are accorded much weight in
Singapore courts, and for this reason are referred to extensively in this
section of the article, given the relative lack of local case law.
(1) Breach of Express Terms in the Employment Contract: If an employee
experiences quid pro quo sexual harassment, suffering detrimental changes
to the terms and conditions of her employment which are unilaterally
Clerk & Lindsell on Tons, supra n 44 at para 7–54.
See, eg, Gore v Gore [1964] MLJ 184; s 3 of the Application of English Law Act (Cap
7A, 1994 Ed). See, generally, Andrew Phang Boon Leong, Cheshire, Fifoot &
Furmston’s Law of Contract: Singapore and Malaysian Edition (2nd ed, 1998), ch 1
(“The Sources of Contract Law in Singapore, Malaysia and Brunei”).
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forced through by her employer because she has refused to comply with
his sexual demands, this may constitute a breach of the express terms of
her contract. Detriment to the employee can take many forms. For
instance, she may have her pay cut, contractual benefits withdrawn, be
intentionally overlooked for a promotion, or transferred to a lower-status
position.
(2) Breach of Implied Terms in the Contract: Apart from the terms which
appear in black and white, employment contracts also contain certain
important implied terms. There is, for instance, an implied term that the
employer is to provide reasonable care for his employer’s safety.144 The
level of the employer’s duty is the same as his common law duty of care
in tort which has been discussed above, and so employees may bring
legal action in either tort or contract law for breach of the duty.14 5
It is also an implied term in employment contracts that the employer will
not, without reasonable and proper cause, conduct himself in a manner
calculated as likely to destroy or seriously damage the relationship of
trust and confidence between himself and his employee.146 The contract
of employment is a special one, different from other contractual
relationships. In many cases, an employer and employee work together
on a daily basis in a common workplace. The employee takes instructions
from the employer and relies on him for pay and benefits, while the
employer relies on his employee’s work for the support and growth of
his enterprise. Therefore, in order that the contract can be effectively
fulfilled, it is essential that both employer and employee have trust and
confidence in each other.
To constitute a breach of this implied term, it is not necessary to show
that the employer intended to breach his employee’s contract of
employment — what the court does is to look at the employer’s conduct
as a whole and determine whether its effect, judged reasonably and
sensibly, is such that the employee cannot be expected to put up with
it.147 A series of actions on the employers’ part may cumulatively amount
144 Smith v Baker & Sons; Wilsons and Clyde Coal Co Ltd v English; Latimer v AEC
Ltd, supra n 113.
145 Matthews v Kuwait Bechtel Corp [1959] 2 All ER 345 (CA); Thompson v Smiths
Shiprepairers (North Shields) Ltd [1984] 1 All ER 881.
146 Courtaulds Northern Textiles Ltd v Andrew [1978] IRLR 84; Woods v WM Car Services
(Peterborough) Ltd [1981] IRLR 347, affirmed [1982] IRLR 413 (CA); Bliss v South
East Thames Regional Health Authority [1985] IRLR 308; Lewis v Motorworld Garages
[1985] IRLR 465 (CA). The local position is the same: Menon v The Brooklands
(Selangor) Rubber Co Ltd [1968] 2 MLJ 186 (FC, Malaysia).
147 Woods v WM Car Services, ibid at 350 ¶ 17; Lewis v Motorworld Garages, ibid at
467–68 ¶ 19–20 (Industrial Tribunal applied wrong test in concluding that the
employers’ conduct was not repudiatory on grounds that they never intended to
repudiate the contract and could not reasonably believe that their conduct would be
accepted as repudiatory).
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to a breach of the implied term, even though each individual incident
might not.148 Any breach of this implied term is considered a fundamental
breach of the employment contract amounting to a repudiation of the
contract by the employer, since it necessarily goes to the root of the
contract.149
It is a breach of this implied term for an employer to use intolerable
behaviour and bad language on an employee. For instance, in Palmanor
Ltd v Cedron,150 the respondent came to work at his employers’ club at
8:30 pm by arrangement. However, the club manager approached him
and asked him why he was late. When the respondent said he was not
late, the manager started to insult him, saying, “You are a big bastard, a
big cunt, you are pig headed, you think you are always right.” When the
respondent told him that he had no right to talk to him like that, the
manager replied, “I can talk to you any way I like, you big cunt,” and
added, “If you don’t like it, you can go.” As the respondent collected his
things and prepared to leave, the manager followed him, still swearing
and saying, “If you leave me now, don’t bother to collect your money,
papers or anything else. I’ll make sure that you don’t get a job anywhere
in London.”
The Employment Appeal Tribunal held that even though the respondent’s
employers had not intended to break his employment contract or dismiss
him, the foul language used by the manager was such that the respondent
could not be expected to tolerate it, even though the words were said in
the heat of the moment or in anger. The respondent was entitled to treat
himself as having been constructively dismissed.151 This case is interesting
as it suggests that an employer can breach an employment contract by
treating an employee in an unacceptable manner, even if it only a single
incident — and this clearly takes place when an employer sexually harasses
his employee.152
The implied term of confidence and trust is also breached where an
employer seduces his employee in circumstances where the employer
exerts undue influence over the employee. In Wood v Freeloader Ltd,153
Woods v WM Car Services, ibid; Lewis v Motorworld Garages, ibid at 468 ¶ 26, 469 ¶
36.
Woods v WM Car Services, ibid at 351 ¶ 22.
[1978] IRLR 303.
On constructive dismissal, see infra Part III.A.3(3).
The decision in Palmanor is preferable to that in Veness v Dyson, Bell & Co, supra n
122. In the latter case, the plaintiff sued her former employers, inter alia because a
partner of the firm had been rude and boorish to her, had humiliated her in front of
her colleagues, and had made her work long hours without her salary being adequately
increased. The court held that there was no implied term in her contract of service
that her employers should treat her with reasonable courtesy. If she was dissatisfied
with her employers’ personal attitude towards her or her long hours of work or
remuneration, she either had to put up with it or leave.
[1977] IRLR 455.
11 S.Ac.L.J. Workplace Sexual Harassment in S’pore: The Legal Challenge 63
148
149
150
151
152
153
the applicant, an immature and impressionable woman of 18, was
employed by the respondent company to look after the small children of
Mr and Mrs Cohen, the respondents’ managing director and company
secretary respectively. Mrs Cohen, aged 30, seduced the applicant into a
lesbian relationship with her. After about 2 weeks, the applicant broke
off the relationship as soon as she was able to obtain the advice and
support of her parents. The Industrial Tribunal found that there is an
implied duty of co-operation between employer and employee and in
particular a duty implied by law that an employer will not do anything
which will undermine the continuation of the confidential relationship
between employer and employee. Mrs Cohen, the de facto employer
behind the corporate veil of the respondent company, had breached this
essential term of the employment contract. Firstly, it was she who seduced
the applicant; secondly, she had exerted undue influence over the
applicant in order to do so; and thirdly, the applicant broke off the
relationship at the first opportunity she had when she was able to act
independently and with the encouragement of her parents. Mrs Cohen’s
conduct had brought about an intolerable situation in which the
confidence between her and the applicant could not be maintained.
Finally, it is a breach of the implied term for an employer not to take an
employee’s complaint of sexual harassment seriously. Among the points
raised in the case of Bracebridge Engineering Ltd v Darby,154 the facts of
which were set out earlier, the Employment Appeal Tribunal was of the
opinion the implied term in employment contracts relating to mutual
obligation, trust, confidence and support is an extremely important one
for female staff in a case where sexual discrimination and investigation
were concerned. On the facts, the respondent had clearly been greatly
upset and had suffered shock and trauma as a result of the sexual
harassment which she had received at the hands of her chargehand and
works manager. Yet, her employers had not treated her complaint with
the seriousness and gravity which they should have. For this reason, her
employers were in breach of contract, and she had been constructively
dismissed from her job.155
(3) Effect of a Breach of Contract; Wrongful and Constructive Dismissal:156
As in general contract law, the effect of an employer’s breach of contract
depends on whether the breach is so fundamental that it “goes to the
root of the contract” and alters the very basis of the employment contract.
If not, the employee cannot treat the contract as terminated and may
only sue to be compensated for any loss sustained as a result of the breach.
Supra n 138.
Ibid at 6 ¶ 17–18.
See, generally, 16 Halsbury’s Laws (4th ed, 1992) at paras 302–03, 305–10.
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Where the employer’s breach does go to the root of the contract, the
employee has a choice: she is entitled to either treat the contract as having
been terminated by her employer’s breach and sue for damages; or may
refuse to accept her employer’s repudiation, keep the contract alive and
sue for her wages.157 It should be noted that if the employee wishes to
treat the contract as terminated she must object clearly to the change in
her employment terms, otherwise her silence may be taken as implied
assent and an election to affirm the contract.158
One example of a situation where the employer will be held to be in
fundamental breach of the contract is where he turns his employee out
of her job altogether for no good reason. In such cases, the employee
may have a cause of action in wrongful dismissal against her employer.
A dismissal is wrongful when it is in breach of the relevant provision in
the employment contract relating to the expiration of the term for which
the employee is engaged. The conditions that must be present are that
(1) she was engaged for a fixed period or a period terminable by notice,
and was dismissed either before the expiry of the fixed period or without
proper notice, and (2) the dismissal was without sufficient cause to permit
the employer to dismiss her summarily.159 The onus lies on the employers
to prove that their complaints against the employee are well-founded
and justify her dismissal.160
An employee need not actually be fired from her job to be dismissed.
Where the detriment suffered by the employee at the hands of her
employer falls short of outright dismissal, she may be able to claim what
is often termed constructive dismissal. This is simply her common law
right to repudiate the contract of service where the conduct of her
employer is such that the latter is guilty of a breach going to the root of
the contract or where he has evinced an intention no longer to be bound
by the contract.161 As the Kuala Lumpur Court of Appeal held in Ang
WE Cox Toner (International) Ltd v Crook [1981] IRLR 443, cited in Bliss v South
East Thames Regional Health Authority, supra n 146; Rigby v Ferodo Ltd [1987] IRLR
516 (HL). See also Samia El-Ibiary v International School (S) Pte Ltd, unreported,
Suit No 2781 of 1987, 14 October 1992 (HC, Singapore), digested at 8 Mallal’s Digest
(4th ed, 1996) para 796 (employers who sought to impose additional terms in
employee’s contract held to be in repudiatory breach of the contract as they rendered
her duties substantially different from what she had contracted to do).
Western Excavating (ECC) Ltd v Sharp [1978] IRLR 27; Rigby v Ferodo Ltd, ibid.
Baillie v Kell (1838) 4 Bing NC 638, 132 ER 934; Edwards v Levy (1860) 2 F&F 94,
175 ER 974; Fletcher v Krell (1872) 42 LJQB 55; cf Cussons v Skinner (1843) 11
M&W 161, 152 ER 758; Hutton v Ras Steam Shipping Co Ltd [1907] 1 KB 834 (CA);
W Dennis & Sons Ltd v Tunnard Bros and Moore (1911) 56 Sol J 162; Acklam v
Sentinel Insurance Co Ltd [1959] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 683.
SR Fox v Ek Liong Hin Ltd [1957] MLJ 1 (HC, Singapore).
Western Excavating (ECC) Ltd v Sharp, supra n 158, cited in Wong Chee Hong v
Cathay Organisation (M) Sdn Bhd [1988] 1 MLJ 92 at 94 (SC, Malaysia). The
employer’s conduct must amount to a fundamental breach of contract — there is no
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Beng Teik v Pan Global Textile Bhd, Penang:162
Where there is no formal order of dismissal, but there is conduct on
the part of an employer which makes a workman consider that he
has been dismissed without just cause or excuse, lawyers term such
conduct “constructive dismissal”. There is no magic in the expression.
It is only a convenient label to describe the kind of conduct we
have referred to. It could be an order of transfer or of demotion.
Or, it could be that the workman has been made redundant by the
employer. Or, it may be a case where the workman is asked to retire.
The categories are not, we emphasize, closed.163
In Wong Chee Hong v Cathay Organisation (M) Sdn Bhd,164 the appellant,
who was the Personnel and Industrial Relations Manager of the
respondent company, successfully negotiated a new collective agreement
with a trade union. Unfortunately, he failed to obtain the backing of his
employers, and after he tried to implement the collective agreement he
was told that he would be transferred to manage a cinema owned by the
respondents. The appellant refused to accept the post as he regarded the
transfer as a breach of his employment contract entitling to hold the
respondents liable for dismissing him without just cause or excuse. The
dispute was referred to the Malaysian Industrial Court. On appeal, it
was held that the transfer was in effect a demotion, although no
disciplinary action had been taken against the appellant. The relegation
of responsibility with its consequent humiliation, frustration and loss of
estimation among fellow employees made it impossible for the appellant
to carry on being employed by the respondent company. He had, in effect,
been driven out of employment, so this constituted constructive dismissal.
It is in connection with the concept of constructive dismissal that the
implied term of trust and confidence takes on special significance. An
employer may try to rid himself of a particular employee by altering the
terms of her employment to make her life so uncomfortable that she
resigns or accepts the revised terms which are detrimental to her. The
employer may be behaving in a totally unreasonable way, but there may
be no blatant repudiation of the contract. However, in such cases, the
remedy in constructive dismissal if the employer has merely behaved unfairly such
that an employee cannot be expected to put up with it: Woods v WM Car Services,
supra n 146; Lewis v Motorworld, supra n 146 at 469 ¶ 36; Holiday Inn, Kuching v
Lee Chai Siok Elizabeth [1992] 1 MLJ 230 (HC, Kuching).
162 [1996] 3 MLJ 137 at 149.
163 For instance, a resignation under compulsion is not a resignation in law but actually a
dismissal: Ng Peng Hon Stanley v AAF Pte Ltd [1978–79] SLR 328, [1979] 1 MLJ 57
(HC, Singapore) (plaintiff employed as a manager of Singapore office asked to resign
by the defendant company’s manager for the Far East region, and given a statement
of the amounts payable to him on the spot).
164 Supra n 161.
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employer may be considered as acting in a manner calculated to destroy
the relationship of confidence and trust between employer and employee.
This will amount to a breach of the implied term of trust and confidence,
which is a fundamental breach of the employment contract and constitutes
constructive dismissal.165
(4) Damages for Breach of Contract:166 Where an employee has been
wrongfully dismissed, the courts will generally not enforce a contract of
employment either by specific performance or injunction. Therefore, the
employee normally has to accept the repudiation of the contract by her
employers and sue for damages.167 An employee is entitled to recover
the estimated monetary loss resulting from the premature termination of
her contract. In accordance with the usual contract law principle, the
employee should, so far as money can do it, be placed in the same position
as if the contract had been performed.168 Therefore, the employee will
usually be awarded as damages the amount of remuneration that she
would have earned had employment continued according to her contract,
subject to a deduction in respect of any amount which she, in minimizing
her damages, either obtained or should reasonably have obtained.169 The
onus is on the employer to show that the employee has or should have
mitigated her loss by obtaining alternative employment.
Where an employee has served out the period of employment specified
in her contract, she will be entitled to recover salary that has been earned
but not paid at the time of dismissal.170 If, however, she is dismissed
without completing the contract period, she cannot sue for her salary
(unless the contract is divisible) but can claim a quantum meruit for the
value of work actually performed, or bring an action for damages for
Post Office v Roberts [1980] IRLR 347; Woods v WM Car Services, supra n 146 at 351
1 20–22; United Bank Ltd v Akhter [1989] IRLR 507 at 512; Imperial Group Pension
Trust Ltd v Imperial Tobacco Ltd [1989] IRLR 66.
See generally Harvey McGregor, McGregor on Damages (16th ed, 1997), ch 27
(“Contracts of Employment”).
General Billposting Co Ltd v Atkinson [1909] AC 118 (HL); Denmark Productions
Ltd v Boscobel Productions Ltd [1968] 3 All ER 513 (CA); Ridge v Baldwin [1963] 2
All ER 66 at 71 (HL). For a local case, see Francis v Municipal Councillors of Kuala
Lumpur [1962] MLJ 407 (PC on appeal from Malaysia).
Robinson v Harman (1848) 1 Exch 850; Radford v De Froberville [1978] 1 All ER 33.
In Gunac Enterprises (Pte) Ltd v Utraco Pte Ltd [1995] 1 SLR 11 (not an employment
case), the Singapore Court of Appeal affirmed this principle, holding that damages in
a contractual claim are compensatory and intended to protect the innocent party’s
expectation interests. As far as possible, the innocent party is to be put in as good as
position as if the contract had been performed.
Beckham v Drake (1849) 2 HLC 579 at 607–08, 9 ER 1213 at 1223–24; SR Fox v Ek
Liong Hin Ltd, supra n 160; Subramaniam v Esso Malaysia Bhd [1990] 3 MLJ 118
(HC, Seremban).
Hartley v Harman (1840) 11 Ad & El 798, 113 ER 617; Goodman v Pocock (1850) 15
QB 576; Hochster v De la Tour (1853) 2 E&B 678, 118 ER 922; Frost v Knight (1872)
LR 7 Exch 111; Brace v Calder [1895] 2 QB 253.
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breach of contract.171 Apart from salary or wages, an employee can recover
the value of benefits in kind such as commission, use of a vehicle, rent-
free accommodation, pension rights and stock options if these are
contractually provided for,172 Similarly, additional payments such as
bonuses, tips and gratuities can only be recovered if the employers are
bound by contract to pay, and the employee is contractually entitled to
receive them. It is not enough for the employee to show that she would
probably have received them.173 An employee is probably also entitled to
claim losses consequential on her dismissal, such as expenses incurred in
finding a new job.174
On the other hand, damages for wrongful dismissal cannot include
compensation for the manner of dismissal (even if harsh and humiliating),
the employee’s injured feelings or any loss sustained by reason that the
dismissal itself made it more difficult for the employee to get fresh
employment.175 For this reason, where the situation permits, it may be
advantageous for an employee to sue in both tort and contract. For
instance, the employee in Bracebridge Engineering Ltd v Darby176 could
also have sued the chargehand and works manager personally in tort for
battery to obtain damages for the indignity and discomfort suffered, apart
from suing her employers for breach of contract. Where a wrongful
dismissal is accompanied by circumstances which give rise to other causes
of action, these do not merge with the proceedings for wrongful dismissal
but remain available at law if the employee wishes to pursue them.177
C. Remedies in the Court: Criminal Sanctions
The harassment suffered by a person may be to such an extent that the
State has an interest in punishing the offender. In most cases, the person
harassed can set criminal proceedings in motion by making a police report
McGregor on Damages, supra n 166 at para 1229,
See, eg, Goh Kim Hai Edward v Pacific Can Investment Holdings Ltd [1996] 2 SLR
109, in which the High Court held (obiter) that if the plaintiff, who was chairman of
the defendant company’s board of directors and group managing director, had
succeeded in his claim he would have been awarded salary, contractual bonus,
employer’s Central Provident Fund contributions, the running costs of his car,
compensation for the loss of use of his chauffeur and a telephone in his residence,
and the values of a club membership and annual medical checkups.
Richardson v Mellish (1824) 2 Bing 229, 130 ER 294; French v Brookes (1830) 6 Bing
354, 130 ER 1316; Lake v Campbell (1862) 5 LT 582; Burton v Pinkerton (1867) LR 2
Exch 340; Ross v Pender (1874) IR 352; Laverack v Woods Ltd [1966] 3 All ER 683
(CA); Middlefield v SAC Technology Ltd [1990] 1 WLR 1002.
McGregor on Damages, supra n 166 at para 1240.
Addis v Gramophone Co [1909] AC 488 (HL); Shone v Downs Surgical [1984] 1 All
ER 7; O’Laoire v Jackel International (No 2) [1991] ICR 718 (CA); SR Fox v Ek
Liang Hin Ltd, supra n 160.
Supra n 138.
SR Fox v Ek Liang Hin Ltd, supra n 160.
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against the offender. The police will carry out an investigation and, if an
offence is made out, refer the matter to the Attorney-General’s Chambers
for prosecution. In minor cases where the police are of the view that no
offence has been committed or the Attorney-General’s Chambers declines
to prosecute, the complainant may commence a private summons against
the offender by swearing a complaint before a magistrate in the
Subordinate Courts.
While there is no specific offence of “sexual harassment” in the Penal
Code178 or any other piece of criminal legislation, depending on the nature
of the harassing behaviour, offenders may be charged with crimes such
as assault and using criminal force,179 wrongful restraint180 and voluntarily
causing hurt or grievous hurt.181 Apart from these, the offences discussed
below can specifically address situations of sexual harassment.
1. Criminal Liability of Harasser
(1) Causing Harassment, Alarm or Distress: It is an offence under section
13A(1) of the Miscellaneous Offences (Public Order and Nuisance) Act182
for any person, with intent to cause harassment, alarm or distress to
another person, to use threatening, abusive or insulting words or
behaviour, or to display any writing, sign or other visible representation
which is threatening, abusive or insulting whether in a public or private
place. If that person or any other person is caused harassment, alarm or
distress as a result of the offender’s actions, the offender may on
conviction be fined up to S$5,000. Where it cannot be proved that the
offender acted intentionally, he may be charged under section 13B(1) of
the same Act which makes an offence for any person to use threatening,
abusive or insulting words or behaviour, or to display any writing, sign
or other visible representation which is threatening, abusive or insulting
in a public or private place within the hearing or sight of any person
likely to be caused harassment, alarm or distress. The maximum fine under
this provision is S$2,000.
These offences would cover acts such as making lewd remarks or
suggestions and telling vulgar jokes to the complainant, and possibly even
displaying pornographic posters or computer screen-savers in the
complainant’s sight. However, one weakness is that the term harassment
is not defined in the Act, and the ordinary meaning of the word connotes
persistent or continual action on the part of the perpetrator. Therefore,
a single incident might not constitute harassment.
Cap 224, 1985 Rev Ed.
Penal Code, ss 349–352.
Ibid, ss 339, 341. See also s 357, which makes it an offence to assault or use criminal
force to any person in attempting to wrongfully confine that person.
Ibid, ss 319–323, 325.
Cap 184, 1997 Ed.
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(2) Outrages of Modesty: Section 354 of the Penal Code criminalizes the
use of assault or criminal force183 on any person with the intent to outrage
the modesty or knowledge that such act is likely to outrage the modesty
of that person. Section 354 applies whether the person whose modesty is
outraged is male or female.184 A person convicted of this offence faces a
maximum jail term of up to 2 years, or with fine or caning, or any two of
such punishments. The cases exhibit a range of unwanted contact ranging
from groping of the complainant’s breasts or private parts, to relatively
minor acts such as kissing or touching. The latter are nevertheless
actionable. The appellant in Soh Yang Tick v Public Prosecutor,185 was
convicted of giving his secretary a light slap on the bottom. He did not
deny having done so, but insisted that he had meant no harm. Yong
Pung How CJ held:
The fact that he intended to have some physical contact said it all.
He intended to touch her, but unfortunately did not realise the
consequences of his action. Singapore, by many standards, is still a
conservative society. Physical contact between persons who do not
know each other well is not appropriate and should not be
encouraged. No doubt there are those who are more liberal and do
not mind such physical contact, but for those who wish to protect
their privacy, the law should do its bit to see that this is respected.
Where minor cases of molest are concerned, a fine is usually imposed. In
Teo Keng Pong v Public Prosecutor186 the offender was fined S$500 and
Criminal force is defined in s 350 of the Penal Code to mean intentionally using force
to any person without that person’s consent in order to cause the committing of any
offence, or intending by the use of such force illegally to cause, or knowing it to be
likely that by the use of such force he will illegally cause injury, fear or annoyance to
the person to whom the force is used. Assault is the making of any gesture or
preparation, intending or knowing it likely that it will cause any person present to
apprehend that he who makes the gesture or preparation is about to use criminal
force to that person: s 351.
Tan Boon Hock v Public Prosecutor [1994] 2 SLR 150 (HC) (male defendant convicted
of outraging the modesty of an undercover policeman by placing his hand on the
policeman’s penis).
[1998] 2 SLR 42 (HC).
[1996] 3 SLR 329 (HC). See also Nordin bin Ismail v Public Prosecutor [1996] 1
CLASNews 250, cited in Teo Keng Pong at 342, in which the appellant, who was
charged with two counts of outrage of modesty for placing his hand on the victim’s
shoulder and on her waist, received on appeal a S$500 fine and one week’s
imprisonment in default for each charge. Contrast Chandresh Patel v Public Prosecutor
[1995] 1 CLASNews 323 (HC) in which it was held that if the act complained of is a
minor one — for instance, stroking the complainant’s thigh on impulse, making a
naughty but harmless nudge, or pinching or smacking the complainant’s bottom — a
fine of S$4,000 or S$5,000 may be adequate punishment. In Soh Yang Tick v Public
Prosecutor, ibid, the appellant was fined S$2,000 for lightly slapping the bottom of his
secretary while chatting with her, an act which the court found was “for the shortest
of moments and had no aggravating factors... and in most likelihood was done on the
spur of the moment.”
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one week’s imprisonment in default for each charge of caressing the
victim’s thigh. An offender is likely to receive a jail sentence if he has
touched the victim more intimately (for instance, placing his hand on her
buttocks or trying to kiss her,187 and the benchmark sentence is at least 9
months’ imprisonment with caning where the complainant’s private parts
or sexual organs have been intruded upon.188 Unfortunately, it is difficult
to discern any sentencing trends among the reported cases; much depends
on each judge’s view how severely the molest in question is viewed by
the judge.
In passing sentence, the gender of the victim is irrelevant.189 However,
the court may take as aggravating factors the youth of the victim, the
fact that the offender has abused a position of trust, and the manner in
which the offender conducts his defence,190 and impose a heavier sentence.
More severe penalties are imposed by the Penal Code if an outrage of
modesty is carried out in particular circumstances. Under section 354A(1),
a person who voluntarily causes or attempts to cause death, hurt, wrongful
restraint, or fear of instant death, instant hurt or instant wrongful restraint,
in order to outrage modesty must be punished with imprisonment between
2 and 10 years and caning. If an offence under section 354A(1) is
committed in a lift or against any person under the age of 14 years, the
punishment is an enhanced jail term between 3 and 10 years with caning.
At present, the norm for offences under this section is 30 months’
imprisonment and 6 strokes of the cane.191
Teo Keng Pong, Ibid (appellant sentenced to 3 months’ imprisonment for caressing
the complainant’s thigh and touching her breast on one occasion, and to 4 months for
caressing her thigh, touching her breasts and kissing her on the cheeks and lips on
another occasion); Tan Pin Seng v Public Prosecutor [1997] 2 CLASNews 365 (HC)
(appellant sentenced to 5 months’ imprisonment for stroking the complainant’s legs
and buttocks).
Chandresh Patel, supra n 186, affirmed in Lee Kwang Peng v Private Prosecutor [1997]
3 SLR 278 (HC) and Zeng Guoyan v Public Prosecutor [1997] 3 SLR 321 (HC). Caning
will only be ordered where the act of molest involves the complainant’s private parts:
Zeng Guoyan, ibid. In the latter case, the defendant was sentenced to 3 strokes of the
cane for touching the complainant’s breast, and another 4 strokes for touching her
groin.
Lee Kwang Peng, ibid (male taekwondo instructor outraged modesty of young male
students).
Zeng Guoyan, supra n 188 (the conduct of defendant, who represented himself during
the trial, was characterised by the court as “reprehensible” — among other things, he
alleged the complainant was a “willing partner” although his defence was one of denial,
humiliated the complainant on the witness stand, asked her irrelevant questions, and
badgered her to such an extent that she broke down on two occasions); Seow Fook
Thiam v Public Prosecutor [1997] 3 SLR 573 (HC) (defendant cast malicious and totally
unfounded aspersions on the complainant’s character, claiming that he was having an
affair with her)
Seow Fook Thiam, ibid (defendant followed the complainant, grabbed her arm, then
hugged her and squeezed her breasts).
187
188
189
190
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Where no assault or criminal force is involved, the law accords the
modesty of women special protection beyond that of men. Under section
509 of the Penal Code, it is an offence for a person, intending to insult
the modesty of any woman, to utter any word, make any sound or gesture,
or exhibit any object, intending that such word or sound shall be heard,
or that such gesture or object shall be seen by the woman. For instance,
this offence would be committed by a man indecently exposing himself
to her, using obscene words intending her to hear them, or showing her
pornographic pictures. A section 509 offence is also committed if the
perpetrator intrudes on the woman’s privacy intending to insult her
modesty. A person convicted of this offence shall be punished with
imprisonment for a term which may extend to 1 year, or with a fine, or
both. In Tan Pin Seng v Public Prosecutor192 the defendant received a
fine of S$2,000 with 1 month’s imprisonment in default for intruding on
the complainant’s privacy by peeping at her through a hole in the
bathroom door while she was showering.
The scope of this provision is illustrated by several cases. In Tarak Das
Gupta,193 decided under an identical section of the Indian Penal Code, an
accused was convicted for sending the complainant a letter containing
indecent overtures and suggesting that she should take certain actions to
show whether she accepted the terms mentioned in the letter. The
defendant in Mahamad Kassam Chisty194 was found guilty of the offence
for following the complainant’s unmarried daughter around in a carriage,
staring and laughing at her, and on occasion even standing up and shouting
her name. This case is a reflection of the cultural norms of early 20th
century India. Nevertheless, the case suggests that a section 509 offence
is probably made out if a man harasses a woman by hounding her and
making improper sexual remarks to her.
(3) Rape and Unnatural Offences: A man who has sexual intercourse with
a woman against her will or without her consent, or with her consent
when such consent has been obtained by putting her in fear of death or
hurt, commits the offence of rape in section 375 of the Penal Code and
may be punished with imprisonment which may extend to 20 years with
fine or caning.195 The tariff in Singapore is at least 10 years’ imprisonment
and not less than 6 strokes of the cane. If the offender pleads guilty,
thereby saving the victim from the further embarrassment and suffering
of reliving the experience in court, he may be given a reduction of one-
quarter to one-third of the standard sentence. However, the victim’s youth,
Supra n 187.
(1925) 28 Bom LR 99.
Unreported, Criminal Appeal No 454 of 1910, 18 January 1911 (HC, Bombay) per
Chandavarkar and Heaton JJ, cited in Ratanlal & Dhirajlal’s Law of Crimes (CK
Thakker ed, 24th ed, 1998), vol 2 at 2516.
Section 376(1), Penal Code.
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an abuse of trust or a position of responsibility by the offender, and the
presence of perversities and gross indignities forced on the victim are all
aggravating factors which will justify a longer sentence.196 Where, in order
to commit or to facilitate the commission of rape, a person voluntarily
causes hurt to a woman or puts her in fear of death or hurt to herself or
any other person, he must serve a minimum of 8 years in prison and be
caned with at least 12 strokes of the cane.197
If a woman is subjected to fellatio, cunnilingus or anal intercourse against
her will, the perpetrator can be charged with the offence of voluntarily
having carnal intercourse against the order of nature under section 377
of the Penal Code.198 This offence attracts the severe penalty of life
imprisonment,199 or imprisonment for up to 10 years, and a fine. The
defendant in Public Prosecutor v Norli bin Jasman200 was sentenced to 3
years’ imprisonment for compelling his 12-year-old niece to perform
fellatio on him, while in Kanagasuntharam v Public Prosecutor201 the
perpetrator was inter alia sentenced to 6 years for fellatio and 8 years for
anal intercourse forced on a 17-year-old girl during a two-hour attack in
a school toilet. The court in Kanagasuntharam took as aggravating
circumstances the fact that the perpetrator had been released from prison
for a section 377 conviction shortly before the offences in this case, and
the fact that he had threatened to kill the victim with a knife, used vulgar
words on her and hit her continuously.
Men who force other men to engage in fellatio or anal intercourse may
also be charged under section 377. For less serious acts, a male perpetrator
may be charged with outraging of modesty under section 354.202 Charges
for conduct ranging from indecent touching to fellatio have also been
brought under the offence of committing an act of gross indecency with
another male person pursuant to section 377A of the Penal Code. The
maximum punishment for this offence is a jail term of up to 2 years. In
Ng Huat v Public Prosecutor,203 the defendant, a radiographer, was
convicted under section 377A for touching a male patient’s penis, chest,
Chia Kim Heng Frederick v Public Prosecutor [1992] 1 SLR 361 (CCA) (defendant
sentenced to 8 years’ imprisonment and 8 strokes of the cane. Although he pleaded
guilty and co-operated fully with the police, he had the responsibility of seeing the
victim safely home and had abused the trust which she reposed in him by raping her.
He had also forced her to masturbate and perform fellatio on him prior to the rape.)
Section 376(2), Penal Code.
Public Prosecutor v Kwan Kwong Weng [1997] 1 SLR 697 (CA).
Which in Singapore means imprisonment for the whole of the remaining period of the
convicted person’s natural life: Abdul Nasir bin Amer Hamsah v Public Prosecutor
[1997] 3 SLR 643 (CA).
Unreported, Criminal Case No 17 of 1996, 19 November 1996 (HC).
[1992] 1 SLR 81 (CCA).
Tan Boon Hock, supra n 184.
[1995] 2 SLR 783 (HC).
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nipples and buttocks during an X-ray examination of the patient’s injured
wrist. In the light of the defendant’s clean record but taking into account
the fact that he had abused the trust which the patient had reposed in
him, he was sentenced to 3 months’ imprisonment. However, the court
was of the view that a substantial term of imprisonment might be justified
if the offending conduct was more serious, and cited Abdul Malik bin
Othman v Public Prosecutor204 in support. In that case, the defendant
was jailed for 6 months for committing an act of fellatio in the children’s
pool of a public swimming complex.
It is noteworthy that employees who are domestic maids are now given
special consideration under the law. Under a recent amendment to the
Penal Code,205 an employer or a member of the employer’s household
who ill-treats a domestic maid206 can be sentenced by the court to one
and a half times the punishment prescribed by law for the crimes
committed. The offences to which this provision applies are causing hurt
or grievous hurt (sections 323 to 325 of the Penal Code), wrongful
confinement (sections 342 to 344), offences impacting the domestic maid’s
modesty (sections 354 and 509), and any attempt, abetment or conspiracy
to commit the foregoing crimes.
2. Employer’s Criminal Liability for Employee’s Wrongdoing?
Where an employee is harassed by a co-worker, an interesting question
is whether criminal charges may also be brought against the complainant’s
employer for contributing to the wrongdoing. For instance, an employer
may have neglected to provide a harassment-free working environment
by not establishing a clear code of conduct for his employees or exercising
poor supervision. He may also have failed to properly investigate and act
on complaints of sexual harassment. Procedurally, there is nothing to
prevent an employer, including a corporation,207 from being charged for
a criminal offence. In the Penal Code, the abetment of a criminal offence
is itself an offence punishable with the same punishment.208 A person is
said to abet the doing of a thing if, among other things, he or she
Unreported, Magistrate’s Appeal No 429 of 1993.
Section 73, introduced by the Penal Code (Amendment) Act 1998 (No 18 of 1998).
Defined by s 73(4) as any female house servant employed in, or in connection with,
the domestic services of her employer’s private dwelling-house and who resides in her
employer’s private dwelling-house.
Section 2(1) of the Interpretation Act (Cap 1, 1997 Ed) defines person and party as
including any company or association or body of persons, corporate or unincorporate.
Section 57 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 1985 Rev Ed) provides that a
corporation may be charged with an offence, and may appear by a representative
appointed by a statement in writing purporting to be signed by the managing director
of the corporation or any person having management of its affairs.
Section 109. If express provision is made by the Penal Code for punishing the abetment
of an offence, that punishment will apply.
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intentionally aids the doing of that thing by any act or illegal omission.209
Under the elaboration in Explanation 2 to that section, doing anything
either prior to or at the time of a commission of an act in order to
facilitate the commission of the act, and thereby facilitating the
commission of the act, is aiding the doing of the act.
Section 43 of the Code defines as illegal anything which is an offence, or
prohibited by law, or which furnishes ground for a civil action. As we
have seen previously in this article, an employee may have civil causes of
action against her employer if acts in the ways described in the preceding
paragraph. Might it not be said that an employer, by “illegally omitting”
to do what was required of him by law, facilitated the commission of an
offence by the harasser and therefore abetted him?
It is submitted that unless the employer actually colludes in some way
with the harasser, it will be very difficult to prove that he abetted the
offence committed. For section 107(c) of the Penal Code to be satisfied,
it must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the employer not
merely aided the harasser but intentionally aided him; that is, he must
have deliberately acted or refrained from acting to assist the wrongdoer
in harassing the complainant. Mere neglect or oversight on his part is
not enough. Furthermore, it is difficult to see how an employer, by failing
to investigate and act on complaints of sexual harassment, facilitates the
commission of the act since the omission takes place after the event.
Can an employer be vicariously liable for a crime committed by his
employee? Neither statute law nor reported decisions in Singapore shed
light on this issue, but at common law a master or principal is in general
not criminally liable for an offence committed by his servant or agent,
even if the crime is committed in the course of employment or agency.210
There are also no laws imposing personal criminal liability on directors
or officers of a corporation for crimes such as those described above
committed by one employee against another.
3. Evidential Rules: The Law of Corroboration
Some comments should be made about the evidential rules on
corroboration in sexual offences. Under Singapore law, a person may be
convicted solely on the evidence of the complainant. In cases involving
sexual offences, while there is no legal requirement that a judges must
warn himself or herself expressly of the danger of convicting on the
complainant’s uncorroborated evidence, it has been held that as a matter
of common sense it is unsafe to convict unless the evidence of the
Section 107(c).
R v Stephens (1866) LR 1 QB 702 at 710; Hardcastle v Bielby [1892] 1 QB 709 at 712.
See 11(1) Halsbury’s Laws (4th ed (reissue), 1990) para 52.
11 S.Ac.L.J. Workplace Sexual Harassment in S’pore: The Legal Challenge 75
209
210
complainant is unusually compelling or convincing, or there is some
corroboration of the complainant’s story.211
There is nothing magical about the words unusually convincing. A
complainant’s evidence will be considered “unusually convincing” if the
prosecution’s case can be proved beyond a reasonable doubt solely on
the basis of that evidence.212 In Public Prosecutor v Teo Keng Pong,213
the appellant, a tuition teacher, was charged with seven counts of
outraging the modesty of one of his female students by touching her
breast, caressing her thigh, squeezing her back and kissing her cheeks
and lips. The prosecution called several witnesses to support its case, but
none of them gave corroborative evidence. Nevertheless, the magistrate
hearing the case found the student’s evidence unusually convincing. She
found the appellant’s explanations for touching the student unbelievable
and convicted him. This ruling was upheld by the High Court.
As regards corroboration, the court’s duty is to analyse all the evidence
and decide if the complainant’s case is so reliable that a conviction based
solely on it is not unsafe. If not, the court should identify which aspects
are not so convincing and for which supporting evidence is required or
desired. In assessing such supporting evidence, the judge must consider if
it makes up for the weakness in the complainant’s evidence in the light
of all the circumstances and all the evidence, including the defence’s
evidence, as well as the accumulated knowledge of human behaviour and
common sense.214
Section 159 of the Evidence Act215 provides for a special kind of
corroborative evidence. It states that: “In order to corroborate the
testimony of a witness, any former statement made by such witness,
whether written or verbal, on oath, or in ordinary conversation, relating
to the same fact at or about the time when the fact took place, or before
any authority legally competent to investigate the fact, may be proved.”
However, it was held in Khoo Kwoon Hain v Public Prosecutor216 that
while such evidence is admissible, it is not corroboration by independent
evidence as it originates from the complainant and therefore has little
additional evidential value.
Tang Kin Seng v Public Prosecutor [1997] 1 SLR 46 at 58 (HC), citing with approval
Public Prosecutor v Mardai [1950] MLJ 33 and Koh Eng Soon v R [1950] MLJ 52.
This rule also applies where the victim is male: R v Burgess (1956) 40 Cr App R 144,
cited in Tang Kin Seng, ibid, at 55.
Public Prosecutor v Teo Keng Pong [1996] 3 SLR 329 at 340 (HC), applied in Lee
Kwang Peng v Public Prosecutor [1997] 3 SLR 278 at 296 ¶ 69 (HC).
Ibid.
Tang Kin Seng, supra n 211.
Cap 97, 1990 Ed.
[1995] 2 SLR 767 at 776–77 (HC).
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In that case the appellant, a supervisor in a restaurant, was charged and
convicted on two counts of aggravated outrage of modesty of a waitress
by putting his hand against her breast, pressing himself against her
buttocks and causing wrongful restraint by hugging her tightly. The
complainant relied on her complaints of the incident to her sister and
the police as evidence corroborating her story under section 159 of the
Evidence Act. However, the court held that the evidence was self-serving
and should not have been treated as independent corroborative evidence.
In the light of this finding, and numerous inconsistencies in the
complainant’s story, the appellant was acquitted as his conviction was
felt to be unsafe.
The rules on corroboration in cases involving sexual offences act as a
safeguard against false stories which have been said to be “very easy to
fabricate, but extremely difficult to refute”,217 but no doubt make it more
difficult for prosecutors to successfully convict alleged harassers.
D. An Assessment of the Law
Currently, Singapore law does not present any clear and coherent means
for victims to seek redress for sexual harassment. As there is no statutory
definition of what constitutes sexual harassment nor specific laws to deal
with it, victims must analyze the individual acts that they have been
subjected to by their harassers, and to try and fit them somewhere within
the pastiche of causes of action available at law.
Tort law today is not well adapted to deal with sexual harassment, which
often takes the form of persistent badgering of the victim rather than
any actual physical contact. The tort of harassment, which is only just
emerging in England, has not yet taken root in Singapore. In any case,
neither the elements which constitute the tort nor the limits of the tort
have been clearly articulated by English courts. At present, to recover
damages it is still necessary for litigants to prove that they have suffered
some physical or psychological injury, no matter how much mental
anguish, annoyance or fear has been endured. It remains to be seen
whether Singapore law will develop along American lines and evolve a
wide-ranging tort of invasion of personal privacy. As regards the tort of
private nuisance, we have seen that it is of only limited use since it can
only be relied on by victims who have a proprietary interest in the
premises on which the nuisance is experienced.
Although it is well-established that at common law employers owe their
employees a duty to take reasonable care for their safety in all the
circumstances of the case so as not to expose them to unnecessary risk, it
217 R v Henry, R v Manning (1968) 53 Cr App R 150 at 153, quoted in Tang Kin Seng,
supra n 211.
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is still not clear whether a work environment in which employees suffer
sexual harassment will be held to be “unsafe” Where harassment has
been committed by a co-employee, an employer will not be vicariously
liable unless the co-employee is exercising a disciplinary or supervisory
role over the victim. Otherwise, the victim’s only recourse is to sue her
harasser directly. However, she may not be fully compensated as he may
not have much financial resources. Since the employer will not have to
pay a cent, there will also be little incentive for him to implement
measures to ensure that sexual harassment does not recur. In any case,
even if the victim can establish that her employer has breached his duty
of care towards her, she can probably only recover damages for physical
or psychological injury suffered by her, and not pure economic losses.
Suing in contract law has its drawbacks as well. By treating sexual
harassment as grounds for terminating an employment contract, the victim
is forced to give up her job in order to obtain redress. The courts do not
generally enforce contracts of employment by specific performance or
injunction. And if the employee claims that she has been wrongfully
dismissed, damages cannot be awarded for the manner in which the
dismissal was effected or for any injury to her feelings, no matter how
humiliating or unreasonable it was.
Finally, criminal law is not really an adequate means for victims to secure
justice against their harassers. Whether action will be taken depends how
seriously the matter is viewed by the police or the Attorney General’s
Chambers. Criminal charges are subject to strict standards of proof and
rules of evidence. It is also highly unlikely that employers will be found
to have abetted the harasser or to be vicariously liable for his wrongdoing
Finally, in most cases, the sanction imposed on a guilty harasser is a fine
or a jail term, and compensation is not awarded to the victim. To obtain
damages, the victim must sue her harasser in separate proceedings. This
is costly, time-consuming and stressful for the victim as she must testify
in court against her harasser all over again.
For these reasons, it is submitted that Singapore law does not fully address
the problem of workplace sexual harassment. Other countries who have
encountered similar situations have since enacted remedial legislation. It
is to this that we now turn.
III. THE RESPONSE IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS
A. The Approaches Taken: Substantive Provisions
A variety of approaches is evident in the laws passed by the jurisdictions
which have taken steps to deal with the issue of sexual harassment.
Some jurisdictions have elected to enact specific provisions defining and
prohibiting sexual harassment in many areas of life. We have already
78 Singapore Academy of Law Journal (1999)
The Act also prohibits sexual discrimination by members of bodies with
power to grant occupational qualifications; in registered organisations,
employment agencies, educational institutions and clubs; in the course of
providing goods, services, facilities or accommodation; in transactions
dealing with the acquisition or disposal of land; and in the performance
of any function, exercise of any power or carrying out of any other
responsibility for the administration of an Australian Commonwealth law
or programme.219 Similar provisions exist in legislation of the Australian
Supra n 15.
Sections 28C–29.
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an employer or employee;
a commission agent or contract worker;
a partner in a partnership.
(a)
(b)
(c)
28B(4): It is unlawful for a commission agent or contract worker to
sexually harass a fellow commission agent or fellow contract worker.
28B(5): It is unlawful for a partner in a partnership to sexually harass
another partner, or a person who is seeking to become a partner, in
the same partnership.
28B(6): It is unlawful for a workplace participant to sexually harass
another workplace participant at a place that is a workplace of both
of those persons.
28B(7): In this section... ‘workplace participant’ means any of the
following:
28B(2): It is unlawful for an employee to sexually harass a fellow
employee or a person who is seeking employment with the same
employer.
28B(3): It is unlawful for a person to sexually harass:
a commission agent or contract worker of the person; or
a person who is seeking to become a commission agent or
contract worker of the person.
(a)
(b)
(a)
(b)
an employee of the person; or
a person who is seeking to become an employee of the person.
seen the definition of sexual harassment in the Australian Commonwealth
Sex Discrimination Act 1984.218 The Act goes on as follows:
28B(1):
 Employment, Partnerships etc. It is unlawful for a person
to sexually harass:
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Capital Territory, Northern Territory, Queensland, South Australia,
Tasmania, Victoria and Western Australia.220
Other jurisdictions simply have legislation which prohibits sexual
discrimination which has been judicially interpreted by the courts to
include a prohibition of sexual harassment.221 For instance, the following
provision appears in Title VII of the US Civil Rights Act 1964:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer:
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to
his compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment
because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex or national
origin or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive
any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such
individual’s race, color, religion, sex or national origin.
In Williams v Saxbe, the Federal Court held for the first time that sexual
harassment is a form of sexual discrimination actionable under Title VII.
In that case, a Justice Department employee successfully established
sexual discrimination when her male supervisor terminated her
employment after she had turned down repeated requests for sexual
favours. The Court was of the view that the supervisor’s conduct had
“created an artificial barrier to employment which was placed before one
gender and not the other, despite the fact that both genders are similarly
situated.”222 The harassment experienced by the victim was a form of
sexual discrimination because her supervisor had only sought sexual
favours from her because she was a woman.
In the United Kingdom, section 1(1) of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975
provides that a person discriminates against a woman for the purpose of
the Act (1) if on the ground of her sex he treats her less favourably than
he treats or would treat a man; or (2) if he applies to her a requirement
or condition which he applies or would apply equally to a man, but (a)
See the ACT Discrimination Act 1991 (No 81, 1991); the NT Anti-Discrimination Act
1994; the Queensland Anti-Discrimination Act 1991; the SA Equal Opportunity Act
1984 (No 95, 1984); the Tasmania Anti-Discrimination Act 1992; the Victoria Equal
Opportunity Act 1995 (Act No 42/1995); and the WA Equal Opportunity Act 1984
(No 83, 1984).
In fact, the statutes of the various Australian states referred to in the preceding footnote
are all anti-discrimination statutes, of which the provisions dealing specifically with
sexual harassment form a part.
(1976) 413 F Supp 654 at 657–58 (DC Cir).
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which is such that the proportion of women who can comply with it is
considerably smaller than the proportion of men who can comply with it,
(b) which he cannot show to be justifiable irrespective of the sex of the
person to whom it is applied, and (c) which is to her detriment because
she cannot comply with it. By section 2(1), the above provisions apply to
discrimination against men as well. Sexual harassment was held to be a
form of unfavourable treatment of a woman on the ground of her sex
falling afoul of the Sex Discrimination Act in Porcelli v Strathclyde
Regional Council.223 This is because the victim would not have been
treated the same way if she were a man in the same situation.
Section 41 of the UK Act goes on to make an employer liable for
harassing behaviour by one of their employees, unless the employer has
taken steps reasonably practical to prevent the harassment. Examples of
such steps might include making policy statements on sexual harassment
which make it clear that such behaviour is unacceptable, having a proper
complaints procedure, acting immediately when allegations of arise, and
training managerial staff to ensure effective implementation of sexual
harassment policies.224 Such a provision avoids the need to show that the
employer is vicariously liable under common law for his employee’s acts.
Finally, it is possible to elevate the right not to be sexually harassed to a
constitutional right or a basic human right. In Canada, the provincial
governments of Manitoba, New Brunswick, Newfoundland, Ontario and
Quebec have made workplace sexual harassment a human rights violation.
For instance, the Ontario Human Rights Code225 states:
7(2): Every person who is an employee has a right to freedom from
harassment in the workplace because of sex by his or her employer
or agent of the employer or by another employee;
7(3): Every person has a right to be free from:
[1986] ICR 564 (CA).
Rohan Collier, supra n 20 at 47.
RSO 1990, c H19.
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225
a sexual solicitation or advance made by a person in a position
to confer, grant or deny a benefit or advancement to the person
where the person making the solicitation or advance knows or
ought reasonably to know that it is unwelcome, or
a reprisal or a threat of reprisal for the rejection of a sexual
solicitation or advance where the reprisal is made or threatened
by a person in a position to confer, grant or deny a benefit or
advancement to the person.
(a)
(b)
Apart from that specific provision, it has also been held that sexual
harassment is a form of sexual discrimination under the Human Rights
Code.226 Provisions analogous to those in the Ontario Human Rights Code
appear in New Zealand’s Human Rights Act 1993.
Given the weaknesses identified in Singapore’s current legal approach to
sexual harassment, it is submitted that consideration should be given to
adopting legislation in one of the above forms. While it is possible to
have a statute specifically dealing sexual harassment, there is much to be
said for taking a wider approach and having legislation which proscribes
sexual discrimination together with discrimination on grounds such as
race, religion, descent, disability and sexual orientation as well. At the
same time, Parliament may wish to consider amending Article 12(2) of
the Constitution to ensure that neither legislation nor government policy
can discriminate against Singapore citizens on the ground of gender or
sex.
B. Alternative Modes of Dispute Resolution
1. In Other Jurisdictions
Litigation is a highly antagonistic way of resolving disputes. In Singapore,
use of the adversarial system of litigation means that parties must file
pleadings and affidavits containing allegations against each other, and
that their witnesses will be subject to rigorous cross-examination to test
their evidence. As trials are held in open court except in special cases,
the parties may be exposed to unwanted publicity. For this reason,
jurisdictions that have enacted legislation against sexual discrimination
have realized that litigation is often not an effective way to settle such
disputes between employers and employees. Instead, provision is made
for complaints of sexual harassment to be dealt with by a designated
official or institution. An inquiry is scheduled, and attempts are made to
bring the parties together to try and achieve a settlement by conciliation.
If the matter cannot be settled, the complaint is then heard by a special
tribunal empowered to grant a wide range of reliefs, some of which are
not available at common law.
For instance, in the United States, Title VII of the US Civil Rights Act
1964 creates a body known as the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) which has authority to investigate and conciliate
complaints that allege a violation of the law on employment
discrimination. Before employees may commence legal action in a court,
they are required to file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. The
Commission then conducts an investigation to find out if there is any
merit to the charge, and will usually hold a fact-finding conference to
226 Bell v Ladas (1980) 1 CHRR D/155 (Board of Inquiry, Ontario); Janzen v Platy
Enterprises Ltd (1989) 10 CHRR D/6205 (SC, Canada).
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work out a settlement using “conference, conciliation, and persuasion”.227
If there is reasonable cause to believe that sexual discrimination has
occurred, the EEOC can persuade the employer involved to voluntarily
eliminate or remedy the problem. It can seek reinstatement of the
employee, back pay and/or restoration of lost benefits. If conciliation fails,
the EEOC can consider the case for a federal lawsuit. In appropriate
cases, the Commission may bring an action on the employee’s behalf and
bear the cost of litigation. Alternatively, after 90 days from the filing of
the complaint, the employee can ask the EEOC for the right to sue in
court. The EEOC will issue a “right to sue” letter, upon which the
employee has 90 days to file a lawsuit in a federal or state court.
In Australia, the Commonwealth Sex Discrimination Act 1984 empowers
the Human Rights Commission established by the Australian
Commonwealth Human Rights Act 1981 to “inquire into alleged
infringements [of the Sex Discrimination Act] and endeavour by
conciliation to effect a settlement of the matters to which the alleged
infringement relate.”228 Written complaints alleging sexual harassment may
be lodged with the Commissioner of Human Rights by the person
aggrieved by the act on her own behalf or on behalf of herself and other
persons aggrieved; by a person on behalf of a class of persons aggrieved;
or by a trade union of which the members include persons aggrieved.229
The Commissioner may also act on his own motion or if matters are
referred to him by the relevant Minister.230
Upon receiving a complaint, the Commissioner is required to inquire into
the act and endeavour by conciliation to effect a settlement of the
matter.231 In the process of doing so, the Commissioner may direct the
complainant and the respondent to attend a compulsory conference.232
He may also order the attendance of other persons who are likely to be
able to provide information relevant to the inquiry or whose presence at
the conference is likely to be conducive to the settlement of the matter,
and to require the production of documents.233 Conferences are held in
private, and parties are not allowed to be represented.234
If a settlement cannot be reached, the Commissioner must refer the matter
to the Human Rights Commission. The Commission will then hold a
public inquiry into the matter.235 The complainant and respondent must
appear personally, but with the Commission’s leave may be represented
These words are taken from Title VII itself.
Section 48(1), Commonwealth Sex Discrimination Act 1984, supra n 15.
Section 50(1).
Section 51.
Section 52(1).
Section 55(1).
Sections 55(2)(c) and 54 respectively.
Section 56(4).
Sections 57(1), 59(1) and 66.
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by solicitors.236 The Commission may endeavour by using reasonable
means to resolve the complaint by conciliation and to “take all such steps
as to it seem reasonable to effect an amicable settlement of a complaint...
and for this purpose may adjourn an inquiry at any stage to enable the
parties to negotiate with a view to settlement of the complaint by amicable
arrangements.”237 During an inquiry, the Commission is not bound by
rules of evidence and may inform itself on any matter in such matter as
it thinks fit. Inquiries are conducted with as little formality and
technicality, and with as much expedition, as the requirements of the
Act and a proper consideration of the matters before the Commission
permit.238
If it finds the complaint to be substantiated, the Commission may make
a wide range of orders, including a declaration that the respondent’s
conduct is unlawful and should not be repeated or continued, an order
that the respondent perform any reasonable act or conduct to redress
the loss or damage suffered by the complainant, a declaration that the
respondent should employ, re-employ or promote the complainant, an
order for damages and an order that the termination of the complainant’s
contract be varied to redress any loss or damage suffered. In particular,
awards for damages for injury to the complainant’s feelings or humiliation
suffered are specifically allowed.239 The Commission’s determinations are
not binding or conclusive between parties; the complainant or the
Commission itself must institute proceedings in the Federal Court of
Australia for an order to enforce the determinations. If the Federal Court
is satisfied that the respondent has engaged in conduct or committed an
act which is unlawful under the Act, it can make such orders as it thinks
fit, including orders giving effect to the Commission’s determinations.240
Similar dispute resolution mechanisms exist in other Commonwealth
jurisdictions such as Canada, England and New Zealand.241
2. In Singapore
Although Singapore presently does not have any legislation specifically
dealing with employment discrimination or sexual harassment, there do
exist mechanisms for resolution of employer-employee disputes apart from
litigation. In addition, alternative dispute resolution methods are also
employed in the course of litigation to assist parties in settling their
disputes without having to proceed to a full trial.
Section 65(1).
Section 73(b).
Section 77(1).
Sections 81(1) and (4).
Sections 81(2), 82(2) and (3).
Canada: see Aggarwal, supra n 16 at 78–79, 84. England: see Hatsbury’s Laws of
England Cumulative Supplement 1996, Part 1, paras 767–771:38.
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(1) Dispute Resolution Under the Industrial Relations Act: The Industrial
Arbitration Court (IAC) was established in 1960 by the Industrial
Relations Act.242 Its main functions are to certify collective agreements
on the terms and conditions of employment made by employers and trade
unions, and to arbitrate industrial disputes which cannot be resolved
amicably through conciliation.243
The Industrial Relations Act sets out various procedures by which
differences between employers and employees may be resolved. Firstly,
where there exists some dispute involving “industrial matters”, which are
defined by section 2 of the Act as “matters pertaining to the relations of
employers and employees which are connected with the employment or
non-employment or the terms of employment, the transfer of employment
or the conditions of work of any person”, a trade union may give notice
to an employer setting out proposals for a collective agreement and
inviting the employer to take part in negotiations.244 If a collective
agreement is reached, it must be brought before the IAC to be certified
and registered.245
However, if the employer does not accept the invitation to negotiate or
if no collective agreement can been reached, either the trade union or
the employer may notify the Commissioner for Labour of the situation.
The Commissioner shall then consult, or direct a conciliation officer to
consult, with the parties to try and persuade the employer to accept the
invitation to negotiate or to assist them to reach agreement by
conciliation.246 If these efforts fail, the Commissioner is to notify the
Minster of Manpower and the Registrar of the IAC that a trade dispute
exists.247 The Minister may then, if he or she considers it possible that
the trade dispute may still be settled by conciliation, direct that parties
attend a conference in private for this purpose.248
Failing the above, the trade dispute may be brought before the IAC for
arbitration. Usually, both the trade union and employer must jointly agree
to make a request that the dispute be submitted to arbitration.249 The
IAC is bound to “carefully and expeditiously hear, inquire into and
investigate every trade dispute of which it has cognizance and all matters
Cap 136, 1985 Rev Ed.
Singapore 1997 (SB Balachandrer ed, 1997) at 234–35.
Section 17 of the Industrial Relations Act (“IRA”).
IRA, s 24.
IRA, ss 19 and 20.
IRA, ss 19(3) and 21.
IRA, s 22.
IRA, s 31(b). In certain cases, a trade dispute may be directed to be submitted to
arbitration by the Minister of Manpower by notice in the Government Gazette, or by
the President of Singapore by proclamation where by reason of special circumstances
it is essential in the public interest that a trade dispute be arbitrated: ss 31(c) and (d).
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affecting the trade dispute and the just settlement of the dispute and
shall determine the dispute by arbitration.”250 In carrying out its duties,
the IAC may have regard not only to the interests of the persons
immediately concerned but to the interests of the community as a whole
and in particular the condition of the economy of Singapore.251 During
the hearing of a trade dispute, the IAC is master of its own procedure
and acts “according to equity, good conscience and the substantial merits
of the case without regard to technicalities and legal forms.” It is not
bound to act in a formal manner or to comply with rules of evidence, but
may inform itself of any matter in such manner as it thinks just.252 Trade
unions may be represented by one of their officers or an industrial
relations officer, while other parties may be represented by employees
or officers of the trade unions which they are members of, but generally
no party may be represented by lawyers or paid agents acting on their
behalf.253 Any award rendered by the IAC is final and not subject to
appeal or review in any court.254
Where the Minister of Manpower is of the view that it may be desirable
for the operation of an award to be extended to bind any person or
trade union not already bound by the award, it may request the IAC to
inquire into the matter and render a report. The IAC must hear
representations from all interested trade unions and persons before
making its decision. If the IAC is of the opinion that it is desirable to
extend the operation of the award, the Minister may make an appropriate
Order to that effect.255
It should be noted that the IAC is expressly enjoined from considering
disputes relating to the dismissal of employees or making awards relating
to the reinstatement of employees.256 In such cases, the Industrial Relations
Act provides a different procedure. Where an employee considers that
she has been dismissed without just cause or excuse, she may, within 1
month of her dismissal, make representations in writing through her trade
union to the Minister of Manpower to be reinstated. The Minister must
give the employer an opportunity to explain his position, and may also
direct the Commissioner for Labour to inquire into whether the dismissal
is indeed unjustified.
If, after considering the representations of the trade union and the
employer, and any report by the Commissioner, the Minister is satisfied
IRA, s 32.
IRA, s 34(a)(a).
IRA, ss 60(1)(b) and (c).
IRA, s 64.
IRA, s 47.
IRA, s 40.
Except where the dismissal is related to the employee’s activities as a trade union
member: IRA, s 35(1).
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that the employee has been dismissed without just cause or excuse, he
may, notwithstanding any rule of law or agreement to the contrary, either
direct the employer to reinstate the employee and to pay her the wages
that she would have earned had she not been dismissed, or direct that
compensation be paid. Failure on the employer’s part to comply with the
Minister’s direction constitutes a criminal offence. The Minister’s decision
is final and cannot be challenged in either the IAC or an ordinary court
of law. Furthermore, any direction made by the Minister bars the
employee from taking out any action for damages for wrongful
dismissal.257
It is submitted that pervasive sexual harassment in the workplace
constitutes an industrial matter which may require resolution between a
trade union and an employer, since it is clearly a matter which pertains
to the relations of employers and employees connected with employment,
the terms of employment or conditions of work.258 Although collective
agreements between employers and trade unions have traditionally dealt
with matters such as pay, leave, rest days and other benefits, there is no
reason why such agreements cannot touch on sexual harassment as well.
In January 1997, the Malaysian Trades Union Congress announced that
it would include a clause on sexual harassment in the collective agreements
of its 163 member unions. The MTUC secretary-general was of the view
that a safe working environment should include freedom from sexual
harassment, and it was the duty of employers to prevent sexual harassment
in the workplace.259
If no collective agreement can be reached, the procedures for conciliation
and arbitration by the IAC established by the Industrial Relations Act
can also be used to resolve the matter. To date, though, it appears that
no sexual harassment cases have yet been brought before the IAC.260
Where an employee has been sexually harassed and, because of her
reaction, is subsequently fired from her job without justification, she may
either elect to sue her employer for wrongful dismissal or avail herself of
the complaint procedure set out in section 35 of the Industrial Relations
Act.
(2) Dispute Resolution Under the Employment Act: The provisions of the
Employment Act261 apply to only certain classes of employees. Under
section 2 of the Act, an employee is a person who has entered into or
works under a contract of service with an employer, and includes
IRA, ss 35(2) to (8).
IRA, s 2.
“Union Pacts to Cover Sexual Harassment”, The Straits Times, 13 January 1997.
Personal correspondence with the Registrar of the IAC in April 1998.
Cap 91, 1996 Ed (“EA”).
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workmen262 and employees of the Government declared by the President
to be employees within the meaning of the Act. It does not, however,
include any seaman, domestic worker, any person employed in a
managerial, executive or confidential person, or any person excluded from
the operation of the Act by notification of the Minister of Manpower.
Under section 14(1) of the Employment Act, an employer may after due
inquiry either dismiss without notice, downgrade, or suspend an employee
employed by him from work without pay for a period not exceeding one
week on the grounds of misconduct inconsistent with the fulfilment of
the express or implied conditions of her service. However, where the
employee considers that she has been dismissed without just cause or
excuse, she may make representations to the Minister of Manpower to
be reinstated. The Employment Act has provisions almost identical to
those found in section 35 of the Industrial Arbitration Act, which were
described above. The main difference is that under the Industrial
Arbitration Act the representations must be made by the employee’s trade
union, whereas the employee can make a personal complaint under the
Employment Act.
An employee whose monthly salary does not exceed S$l,600263 has
additional recourse under section 115 of the Employment Act. This section
empowers the Commissioner for Labour to inquire into and decide any
dispute between an employee and her employer where the dispute arises
out of any term in the contract of service or out of any of the provisions
of the Act. Incidents of sexual harassment can lead to disputes within
the meaning of section 115, as we have seen that the harassment itself or
an employer’s failure to investigate complaints of harassment may
constitute a breach of the express or implied terms in the employee’s
contract of employment. In addition, the Employment Act contains several
provisions regulating situations when an employee’s contract may be
terminated264 or where an employee may be summarily dismissed.265 If
A workman is defined by s 2 as (a) any person, skilled or unskilled, who has entered
into a contract of service with an employer in pursuance of which he is engaged in
manual labour, including any artisan or apprentice, but excluding any seaman or
domestic worker; (b) any person, other than clerical staff, employed in the operation
of mechanically propelled vehicles used for the transport of passengers for hire or for
commercial purposes; (c) any person employed partly for manual labour and partly
for the purpose of supervising in person any workman in and throughout the
performance of his work; (d) any person specified in the First Schedule to the EA, ie
bus conductors; lorry attendants; bus, lorry and van drivers; bus inspectors; goldsmiths
and silversmiths; tailors and dressmakers; harbour-craft crew and all workmen employed
on piece rates in their employer’s premises; and (e) any person whom the Minister of
Manpower declares to be a workman for the purposes of the EA.
Employment (Salary of Employees) Notification (Cap 91, 1996 Ed, N2).
EA, ss 9–10 (giving of notice) and 11 (payment of salary in lieu of notice).
EA, ss 13 (absence of employee from work) and 14(1) (employee’s misconduct).
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incidents of sexual harassment lead to the employee being wrongfully
dismissed, this might be a breach of the Employment Act leading to a
dispute arising out of the provisions of the Act.
The employee must lodge her claim with the Labour Relations
Department of the Ministry of Manpower within a year of the matters
out of which the complaint arises or, if the complaint involves a
termination of her contract of service, within 6 months of the
termination.266 A conciliation meeting chaired by a labour relations officer
will usually be arranged for the employee and her employer to try and
resolve the dispute. If the dispute cannot be settled, the Commissioner
will then summon the party against whom the claim is made as well as
all persons whose interests are likely to be affected by the proceedings
to attend at a hearing of the claim at the Labour Court.267
Before the claim is heard, the Commissioner may convene a preliminary
inquiry to attempt settlement between the parties.268 If this fails, the
Labour Court will proceed to hear the claim. As in the IAC, the
Commissioner for Labour acts according to “equity, good conscience and
the merits of the case without regard to technicalities”, and is not bound
to act in a formal manner or to follow rules of evidence but may inform
himself on any matters in such manner as he thinks fit.269 The Labour
Court has power to summon people to attend the hearing and hear
evidence from witnesses on oath or affirmation before giving its decision.270
An employee may be represented by an officer of the trade union of
which she is a member while an employer may be represented by an
employee, but neither party may engage lawyers or paid agents to appear
on their behalf.271 The Labour Court’s decision is appealable to the High
Court.272
Similar to the procedure for complaints to the Minister of Manpower
under section 35 of the Industrial Relations Act and section 14 of the
Employment Act, an employee cannot enforce her civil rights and
remedies for any breach or non-performance of her employment contract
in a civil court if she has already instituted proceedings before the Labour
Court, unless proceedings are not pursued to judgment.273
(3) Court Dispute Resolution: Finally, it should be mentioned that
mechanisms for alternative dispute resolution are also built into the
EA, ss 115(2) and 119(1)(a).
EA, s 119(1)(b).
EA, ss 119(1)(e)-(g).
EA, s 119(2).
EA, ss 119(1)(h) and (i).
EA, s 120.
EA, s 117.
EA, s 132.
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litigation process in Singapore.274 Mediation was formally introduced in
the Subordinate Courts in 1994 with the establishment of the Court
Mediation Centre, now known as the Primary Dispute Resolution Centre.
In civil proceedings after the close of pleadings, the registrar hearing the
summons for directions in the matter will usually inquire if the litigants
have any objections to attending a settlement conference. If not, a
tentative date about four weeks after the summons for directions will be
set for the conference. Alternatively, either party to a dispute may write
to the Director of the Primary Dispute Resolution Centre at any time
after legal proceedings have been commenced to request for a settlement
conference to be convened.275 The process is voluntary and free of charge.
The settlement conference is presided over by a district judge, who will
hear submissions by the parties’ solicitors and propose ways of settling
the dispute. The settlement judge may also direct that parties attend in
person so that he or she may speak to them if it is felt that this will
promote a settlement. If a matter cannot be settled at the Primary Dispute
Resolution Centre and proceeds to trial, a different judge will hear the
case. Matters raised during a settlement conference are treated in strict
confidence, and may not be referred to at trial since the conference
proceeds on a without-prejudice basis.276 All attendance notes taken by
the settlement judge are kept separate from the court papers before the
trial judge.
Court dispute resolution in Singapore appears to have been fairly
successful — in 1995, a total of 960 cases were settled out of the 1,133
for which settlement conferences were convened. This represents a
settlement rate of 85%.277
Where no settlement on liability is reached but the quantum of damages
has been agreed upon, parties may choose to have their dispute
determined in a more informal mediation-arbitration before a district
judge or registrar in chambers rather than by trial in open court.
Mediation-arbitration was introduced at the launch of the Sixth Workplan
of the Subordinate Courts in 1997. After a dispute has been adjudicated
by mediation-arbitration, the matter is referred back to the settlement
judge who concludes the case by giving necessary orders on the issues
earlier determined.
To further promote the use of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms,
in district court actions involving claims of between S$100,000 and
See Lim Lan Yuan & Liew Thiam Leng, Court Mediation in Singapore (1997) at 50–
53, 75–101; and Lim Lan Yuan, The Theory and Practice of Mediation (1997) at 219–
23.
Subordinate Courts Practice Directions, paras 23(3) and (4).
Ibid, paras 23(11) and (12).
Lim & Liew, supra n 274 at 52–53.
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S$250,000 pre-trial conferences are held after the close of pleadings.278
At such conferences, the possibility of resolving the dispute or particular
issues in the dispute by alternative dispute resolution is discussed. If
parties consent to mediation at the Singapore Mediation Centre or the
Primary Dispute Resolution Centre, the registrar hearing the pre-trial
conference will refer the matter accordingly.279
Settlement conferences and mediation-arbitration are not carried out in
the High Court. Instead, the Registry of the Supreme Court identifies
suitable cases for mediation, and during pre-trial conferences parties are
encouraged to avail themselves of the services of the Singapore Mediation
Centre, which was incorporated in August 1997 by the Singapore
Academy of Law as a company limited by guarantee. Solicitors may also
write to the Registrar to request for cases to be referred to the Centre.
As an incentive to use the Centre’s mediation services, parties who have
attempted mediation in good faith and made reasonable attempts to
resolve their dispute by such means may, if the mediation is unsuccessful,
request for a waiver or refund of a part or all of the court hearing fees
that have been paid or will have to be paid for a trial.280
In the absence of any statute specifically addressing the problem of sexual
harassment, these modes of alternative dispute resolution provide avenues
for employers and employees to settle complaints of harassment without
a trial, thus achieving a result which is satisfactory to both parties and
which saves time and expense.
IV. THE INSURANCE DIMENSION
We have seen that acts of sexual harassment may amount to a tort, a
breach of contract, or a criminal offence. Employees who have civil causes
of action may sue their employers for damages, interest and legal costs.
There is also statutory provision for compensation to be awarded to
victims in criminal cases. In this Part, we examine whether employers
may insure themselves against the risk of having to making payments to
employees as a result of sexual harassment on their own part, or on the
part of their other employees.
In general, the principle ex turpi causa non oritur actio — no action arises
from a base cause — applies in the context of insurance contracts. This
principle was set out by Diplock LJ in Hardy v Motor Insurer’s Bureau281
in a passage that deserves to be quoted in full:
Pursuant to O 34A of the Rules of Court. See the Subordinate Courts Practice
Directions, para 23A(1).
Ibid, paras 23A(4) and (6).
Registrar’s Circular No 4 of 1997.
[1964] 2 QB 745 at 767–68.
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The rule of law on which the major premise is based — ex turpi
causa non oritur actio — is concerned not specifically with the
lawfulness of contracts but generally with the enforcement of rights
by the courts, whether or not such rights arise under contract. All
that the rule means is that the courts will not enforce a right which
would otherwise be enforceable if the right arises out of an act
committed by the person asserting the right (or by someone who is
regarded in law as his successor) which is regarded by the court as
sufficiently anti-social to justify the court’s refusing to enforce that
right... The court has to weigh the gravity of the anti-social act and
the extent to which it will be encouraged by enforcing the right
sought to be asserted against the social harm which will be caused if
the right is not enforced. [Emphasis added.]
The principle has two implications in insurance law which concern us.
Firstly, it means that as a matter of course a court will decline to enforce
insurance contracts which seek to insure risks which are unlawful or
otherwise contrary to public policy. It is clear, for instance, that insurance
policies which cover intentional criminal acts committed by the insured
are unenforceable. So, if a motorist insures his car, intending from the
beginning to make criminal use of it, and the insurers are aware of this
intention, the policy is bad in its inception.282 It would appear that the
principle extends to torts intentionally committed by the insured as well.
In WH Smith & Son v Clinton & Harris,283 it was held that an indemnity
given by a publisher to a printer against liability for libel was not
enforceable. It is not clear, though, whether a deliberate breach of contract
is sufficiently “anti-social”.
Secondly, even if a risk insured against is itself unobjectionable, a court
will nonetheless decline to enforce the policy if the insured’s conduct is
regarded by the law as unlawful or anti-social. Much insight into this
issue can be gained by examining the decision of the House of Lords in
Beresford v Royal Insurance Co.284 The question in that case was whether
the personal representative of an assured under a life insurance policy
was entitled to the insurance proceeds if the assured had committed
suicide. On the facts, the policy specifically provided that the insurers
would pay under the policy if the assured committed suicide after the
expiry of one year from the commencement of the policy.
The House of Lords held that even though the insurance policy had
expressly permitted recovery in the circumstance specified, such a policy
was legally unenforceable because “no system of jurisprudence can with
reason include amongst its rights which it enforces rights directly resulting
Hardy v Motor Insurers’ Bureau, ibid.
(1908) 99 LT 840.
11938] AC 586 (HL).
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to the person asserting them from the crime of that person.”285 Despite
the express words purporting to insure against a loss due to the insured’s
own wilful misconduct, the court would not permit recovery as it would
be against public policy to do so. The principle applies to wilful
misconduct which amounts to a crime; it has yet to be seen whether
recovery is possible if the misconduct only amounts to a tort or a breach
of contract.
It would appear, though, that where an insured’s act constitutes a crime
but was due to inadvertence or negligence rather than an intentional
breach of the law, a court may be prepared to permit recovery. In New
India Assurance Co Ltd v Woo Ching Fong,286 the insured, who was drunk,
drove her a car into a tree and killed herself. It was not disputed that
she had committed a statutory offence by driving under the influence of
alcohol to an extent where she was incapable of having proper control of
her car. Nevertheless, the Singapore Court of Appeal held that since her
act was inadvertent rather than deliberate, her estate was entitled to claim
under her insurance policy.287
Apart from the ex turpi causa principle, it was held in Beresford by Lord
Atkin that “[o]n ordinary principles of insurance law an assured cannot
by his own deliberate act cause the event upon which the insurance money
is payable. The insurers have not agreed to pay on that happening.”
Insurance is for fortuitous events only, not for cases where the assured
has not only exposed himself to risk but has actually caused the risk to
occur.288 Therefore, “the fire assured cannot recover if he intentionally
burns down his house,289 nor the marine assured if he scuttles his ship,290
nor the life assured if he deliberately ends his life. This is not the result
of public policy, but of the correct construction of the contract.”291 The
principle applies equally where the assured himself is not directly involved,
but acts causing the risk to occur have been done with his privity or
consent.292
Ibid at 596, citing Cleaver v Mutual Reserve Fund Life Association [1892] 1 QB 147 at
156. See also Geismar v Sun Alliance & London Insurance Ltd [1977] 2 Lloyd’s Rep
62 (insured not entitled to enforce an insurance indemnity against loss of articles which
the insured deliberately imported into the country without payment of customs duty,
a breach of the Customs and Excise Act 1957)
[1962] MLJ 432 (CA, Singapore)
See also Minasian v Aetna Life Insurance Co (1936) 3 NE 2d 17 at 19 (Massachusetts);
Shaw v Gillan (1982) 143 DLR (3d) 232 at 237 (HC, Ontario) (wife who killed husband
by her careless driving allowed to enforce his life insurance in her favour).
British Marine v Gaunt [1921] 2 AC 41 at 52, 57.
Upjohn v Hitchens [1918] 2 KB 48 at 58; City Tailors v Evans (1921) 38 TLR 230 at
233–34.
Samuel v Dumas [1924] AC 431; see also the Marine Insurance Act (Cap 387, 1994
Ed), s 55(2)(a).
Beresford, supra n 284 at 595. See also WH Smith & Son v Clinton & Harris, supra n
283, and Marks v Philip Trent & Sons Ltd [1954] 1 QB 29 at 39.
Midland Insurance v Smith (1881) 6 QBD 561; Samuel v Dumas, supra n 290.
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Malaysia and Singapore have both accepted this rule of construction. In
Brighton Industries (M) Sdn Bhd v Supreme-QBE Insurance Bhd,293 which
involved a fire insurance policy, the insurers succeeded in showing that
the fire was set wilfully or with the connivance of the insured. In the
premises, recovery under the policy was disallowed by the court. Similarly,
in Ng Choon Hoo trading as Overseas Union Radio & Electric Co v The
Nippon Fire & Marine Insurance Co Ltd294 the Singapore High Court
found that the fire was deliberately started by the insured, his servants
or agents. The courts in both cases noted that as contentions of wilful
misconduct or connivance on the part of the insured in causing the risk
to occur are serious allegations, they must be proved to a higher degree
of probability than that required to establish negligence.
The foregoing suggests that insurance contracts which specifically purport
to cover acts of intentional sexual harassment by the insured himself (at
least those which amount to a crime or a tort) are unenforceable.
Furthermore, even if the insurance contract’s object is not anti-social, as
would be the case with a general all-risks policy, the insured would be
denied recovery under the policy if he committed an act of sexual
harassment which constitutes a crime or a tort, unless he was acting
inadvertently or negligently. The basis of this would either be the ex
turpi causa principle, or the rule of construction preventing recovery by
insured persons who themselves cause the risk to occur. It is not yet
clear whether an insured would be disentitled from claiming under a policy
if his acts of sexual harassment amount only to breaches of his employee’s
contract of employment.
On the other hand, there is no objection to a person effecting insurance
against the consequences of wilful misconduct on the part of his servants
or agents.295 Thus, fidelity policies are valid. Such policies are designed
to protect an assured against the contingency of a breach of fidelity on
the part of a person in whom confidence has been placed (usually an
employee). Since fidelity policies can be extended to cover acts such as
an employee’s wilful default29 6 or negligence,297 it is submitted that
insurance policies protecting employers against loss and expense
occasioned by sexual harassment committed by their employees are valid
and enforceable.
[1992] 3 CLJ 1424 (HC, Johor Bahru).
[1996] 3 SLR 180 (HC).
Shaw v Robberds (1837) 6 Ad & El 75, 112 ER 29; Midland Insurance v Smith, supra
n 292; Lind v Mitchell (1928) 45 TLR 54; Goddard Smith v Frew [1939] 4 All ER 358.
See also Ohio Casualty Insurance Co v Welfare Finance Co (1934) 75 F 2d 58 (8th
Cir), certiorari denied 296 US 734 (employer entitled to enforce indemnity for punitive
damages awarded against him in respect of tort committed by servant); Higgins v
Orion Insurance Co [1985] CCLI 139 (CA, Ontario) (wilful misconduct of a partner).
Kenney v Employers’ Liability Assurance Corpn [1901] 1 IR 301.
American Surety Co of New York v Wrightson (1910) 103 LT 663; Pawle & Co v
Bussell (1916) 114 TLR 805.
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In the American decision of Western Casualty & Surety Co v Aponaug
Manufacturing Co,298 the court went so far as to permit a corporation to
insure against liability for assault committed by its president. Nonetheless,
the more prevalent view is that the acts of persons in high managerial
positions should be regarded as acts of the corporation itself.299 In such a
case, an insurance policy taken out by a corporation would only be
enforceable if it expressly covered deliberate acts of its managers.
At present, it appears to be virtually unheard-of for insurance companies
in Singapore to insure employers from the pecuniary consequences of
sexual harassment. Nevertheless, insurance may become a necessity if
the incidence of sexual harassment does not diminish and victims who
are more aware of their legal rights begin instituting legal proceedings
against their employers in larger numbers. Insurance would also ensure
that employees who succeed in proving their employers responsible for
the sexual harassment they suffer will be able to recover damages from
them.
V. CONCLUSION: THE LEGAL CHALLENGE
On 7 May 1988, Singapore signed the Declaration of the Advancement
of Women in the ASEAN region (the Bangkok Declaration) together
with Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand.300 Under
its terms, the parties to the Declaration recognized “the importance of
active participation and integration of women in the region in sharing
the future development and progress of ASEAN and the necessity of
meeting the needs and aspirations of women in the ASEAN Member
Countries” and were cognizant of “the multiple roles of women in the
family, in society and in the nation and the need to give full support and
provide facilities and opportunities to enable them to undertake these
tasks effectively”.
Among the declarations made, the parties stated that, “in the context of
strengthening regional co-operation, collaboration and co-ordination for
the purpose of advancing the role and contribution of women in the
progress of the region”, each member country, either individually or
collectively, in ASEAN would endeavour:
(1952) 197 F 2d 673 (5th Cir). See also Morgan v Greater New York Taxpayers Mutual
Insurance Association (1953) 112 NE 2d 273 (New York) (partner covered in respect
of partnership liability for assault committed by another partner).
Glen Falls Indemnity Co v Atlantic Building Corporation (1952) 199 F 2d 60 (4th Cir);
Greater New York Mutual Insurance Co v Perry (1958) 178 NYS 2d 760; S &Y
Investments (No 2) Pty Ltd v Commercial Union Assurance Co Ltd (1986) 82 FLR 130
(Northern Territory, Australia).
Regional Treaty No R83. It entered into force on 5 July 1988.
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298
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300
To promote and implement the equitable and effective
participation of women whenever possible in all fields and at
various levels of the political, economic, social and cultural life
of society at the national, regional and international levels.
To enable women in the region to undertake their important
role as active agents and beneficiaries of national and regional
development, particularly in promoting regional understanding
and co-operation and in building more just and peaceful
societies.
To integrate in national plans the specific concerns of women
and their roles as active agents in and beneficiaries of
development, specifically considering their role as a productive
force to attain the full development of the human personality.
UN Gen Ass Resn 34/180, GAOR, 34th Sess, Supp 46, p 193; Bowman & Harris
Treaty No 769; 19 ILM 33; UKTS 2 (1989), Cm 643; UNTS 20378. For an ovetview of
CEDAW’s impact on Singapore law, see Thio Li-ann, “The Impact of
Internationalisation on Domestic Governance: Gender Egalitarianism and the
Transformative Potential of CEDAW” (1997) 1 SJICL 278.
301
The right to work as an inalienable right of all human beings;
The right to the same employment opportunities, including the
application of the same criteria for selection in matters of
employment;
The right to free choice of profession and employment, the right
to promotion, job security and all benefits and conditions of
service and the right to receive vocational training and
retraining, including apprenticeships, advanced vocational
training and recurrent training;
The right to equal remuneration, including benefits, and to equal
treatment in respect of work of equal value, as well as equality
of treatment in the evaluation of the quality of work;
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
Subsequently, on 5 October 1995, Singapore acceded to the Convention
on the Elimination of AH Forms of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW).301. Article 2 of the Convention condemns “discrimination
against women in all its forms” and binds state parties to “pursue by all
appropriate means and without delay a policy of eliminating discrimination
against women”. In particular, Article 11 paragraph 1 states that:
State Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate
discrimination against women in the field of employment in order
to ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women, the same rights,
in particular:
1.
2.
3.
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It is noteworthy that in 1992 the Committee on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women, which is established by Article
17 of CEDAW to monitor its implementation, noted that equality in
employment could be seriously impaired when women were subjected to
gender-specific violence such as sexual harassment in the workplace. This
could be humiliating and could constitute a health and safety problem. It
could also be discriminatory when the woman had reasonable grounds to
believe that her objections to the harassment would disadvantage her in
connection with her employment. The Committee recommended that
effective legal and other measures be taken to sanction and prevent sexual
harassment.302
It is submitted that Singapore, as a state party to both the Bangkok
Declaration and to CEDAW, has committed itself to enacting legislation
and adopting policies which effectively proscribe sexual harassment, since
this is one aspect of discrimination against women in the field of
employment. However, the view at the ministerial level is that Singapore’s
existing laws, values and practices are consonant with those CEDAW
espouses, and that no amendments are required.303 Such a dismissive view
is to be regretted. In view of the 1993 AWARE report, while further
research is certainly desirable, sexual harassment in the employment
context does appear to be a problem in Singapore which cannot be swept
under the carpet. It is submitted that since Singapore law is currently not
well-adapted to cope with the problem, there is a need for remedial
legislation to be enacted to protect employees, both female and male,
against sexual harassment in the workplace and in other areas of life.
Therein lies the legal challenge.
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The right to social security, particularly in cases of retirement,
unemployment, sickness, invalidity and old age and other
incapacity to work, as well as the right to paid leave;
The right to protection of health and to safety in working
conditions, including the safeguarding of the function of
reproduction.
(e)
(f)
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